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1. INTRODUCTION 
This report has been prepared in accordance with Article 109j(l) of the Treaty which requires 
the Commission to report to the Council on the progress made in the fulfilment by the Member 
States of their obligations regarding the achievement of economic and monetary union (EMU)-. 
The European Monetary Institute (EMI) is similarly required to report to the Council. 
These reports are the first steps of the procedure set out in Article 109j which leads to the 
Council, meeting in the composition of the Heads of State or Government, deciding for the first 
time, not later than 31 December 1996, whether a majority of the Member States fulfils the 
necessary conditions for the adoption of a single currency and whether it is appropriate for the 
Community to enter the third stage. 
In practice it has been clear for some time that, despite the considerable progress made by 
Member States with all aspects of convergence and with other preparations for EMU, a 
majority of Member States has not yet achieved a sufficiently high degree of sustainable 
convergence. This is notably because many Member States have not yet reached a satisfactory 
situation as regards the sustainability of the government financial situation. The European 
Council in Madrid in December 1995 already came to the conclusion that conditions would 
not be appropriate for an early start to the third stage but confirmed that the third stage of EMU 
would indeed begin on 1 January 1999. This agreement on the starting date was reiterated by 
the European Council in Florence in June 1996. The decisions about which Member States will 
be in the first group adopting the single currency will be made as early as possible in 1998. 
The role of the present report, apart from meeting the formal requirements of the Treaty, is thus, 
first, to examine the current state of convergence and of the compatibility of national legislation 
with Treaty obligations and, second, to review the progress that has been made since the 
beginning of stage two of EMU on 1 January 1994. 
The structure of the report follows that established by Article 109j(l). Chapter 2 examines the 
compatibility between each Member State's national legislation (including the statutes of its 
national central bank) and Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB. The 
following four chapters (Chapters 3-6) examine in turn the convergence performance of the 
Member States in relation to each of the four criteria, concerning price stability, the 
government budgetary position, exchange rates and long-term interest rates. Chapter 7 looks 
at developments in several other areas that are to be taken account ofin the Commission and 
EMI reports: development of the ECU, the results of the integration of markets, the balances 
of payments on current account, and unit labour costs and other price indices. Afinal chapter 
(Chapter 8) summarises the conclusions of the report. 
(continued on page 2) 
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According to the Edinburgh agreement, Denmark has an­
nounced that it will not participate in the third stage of 
EMU, but that it remains fully committed to taking part in 
economic and monetary cooperation during the second 
stage of EMU. With this in mind, developments in Denmark 
have been included in this report. 
Similarly, although the United Kingdom has notified the 
Council, in accordance with paragraph 1 of Protocol 
No 11, that it does not intend to move to the third stage in 
1997, it might do so later and developments in the 
United Kingdom have also been included in this report. 
On the basis of this report and that of the EMI the Commis­
sion is separately submitting to the Council a recommenda­
tion for the assessment by the Council in accordance with 
Article 109j(2). 
2. COMPATIBILITY OF NATIONAL 
LEGISLATION WITH THE TREATY AND 
THE STATUTE OF THE EUROPEAN 
SYSTEM OF CENTRAL BANKS 
According to the second sentence of Article 109j(l) of the Treaty, 
the reports drawn up under this article "shall include an examina­
tion of the compatibility between each Member State's national 
legislation, including the statutes of its national central bank, and 
Articles 107 and 108 of this Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB". 
The present chapter is devoted to this examination. The first sec­
tion summarizes adaptations of national law since the signing of 
the Treaty on European Union in February 1992. The second sec­
tion includes a recapitulation of the relevant provisions of the 
Treaty and the ESCB Statute. The third section summarizes the 
results of a review of national central bank legislation in the light 
of these provisions; it indicates types of provisions which are still 
found to be incompatible with the requirements of the Treaty or 
the Statute and which are expected to be changed before the es­
tablishment of the ESCB. The fourth section indicates legislative 
reforms which are at present planned in the perspective of the 
third stage. 
2.1. Adaptation of national law since the signing 
of the Treaty 
Since the signing of the Treaty on European Union and its entry 
into force, statutes of many national central banks (NCBs) have 
been adapted in order to comply with the Treaty. 
Some of these changes aimed at ensuring compliance with Article 
104 which prohibits central bank credit to the public sector and 
with Article 104a which prohibits the granting of privileged ac­
cess by governmental or public bodies to financial institutions. 
These rules are in force since the beginning of the second stage. 
Member States have adapted their regulatory framework in a sat­
isfactory manner to these requirements, so that no significant dif­
ficulties have occured. 
The statute of the Banque de France was amended in 1993. The 
responsibility for the formulation and the implementation of 
monetary policy has been vested in a "Monetary Policy Council", 
which must not seek or accept instructions from the government 
or any other body, whilst a "General Council" carries out all other 
management responsibilities at the bank. Furthermore, the objec­
tive of the bank to ensure price stability has been redefined. 
The legal regime of the Banco de Espana was adapted in 1994. 
The law established price stability as the primary objective of 
monetary policy which is to be defined and implemented by the 
bank. Neither the government nor any other public authority may 
give instructions to the bank regarding either the objectives or the 
implementation of monetary policy. 
In Belgium, an amendment in 1993 restricted opposition and sus­
pension rights of the Government Commissioner and the Minister 
of Finance in matters concerning the definition and implementa­
tion of monetary policy, the conduct of foreign exchange opera­
tions, the holding and management of official foreign reserves 
and the promotion of the smooth operation of payment systems. 
In Italy, the authority to determine the discount rates has been 
transferred from the Minister of the Treasury to the Governor of 
the Banca d'Italia in 1992. Furthermore, the Banca d'Italia has 
been given the responsibility for setting reserve requirements 
within certain limits and for overseeing payment systems. 
In Portugal, the amendments of the law on the Banco de Portugal 
were adopted in 1995. The law, inter alia, redefined the primary 
objective of the bank, i.e. to maintain price stability, taking into 
account the overall economic policy of the government. 
2.2. Recapitulation of relevant provisions of the 
Treaty and the ESCB Statute 
Article 107 of the Treaty ensures that the ESCB will operate free 
from instructions from third parties. It reads as follows: 
"When exercising the powers and canying out the tasks and du­
ties conferred upon them by this Treaty and the Statute of the 
ESCB, neither the ECB nor a national central bank, nor any mem­
ber of their decision­making bodies shall seek or take instruc­
tions from Community institutions or bodies, from any govern­
ment of a Member State or from any other body. The Community 
institutions and bodies and the governments of the Member States 
undertake to respect this principle and not to seek to influence the 
members of the decision­making bodies of the ECB or of the na­
tional central banks in the performance of their tasks. " 
Article 108 of the Treaty obliges Member States to adapt national 
legislation in accordance with the requirements of EMU: 
"Each Member State shall ensure, at the latest at the date of the 
establishment of the ESCB, that its national legislation including 
the statutes of its national central bank is compatible with this 
Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB. " 
The article refers to the compatibility of national legislation with 
the Treaty's provisions in general. This includes compatibility 
with Article 105' " of the Treaty which defines the objectives of 
the ESCB, the first two sentences of which read as follows: 
"The primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price 
stability. Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the 
ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the Commu­
nity with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objec­
tives of the Community as laid down in Article 2. " 
The Statute of the ESCB1 includes in its Article 14.2 rules on the 
security of tenure: 
"The statutes of the national central banks shall, in particular, 
provide that the tenn of office of a Governor of a national central 
bank shall be no less than five years. 
1 Sec Protocol (No 3) of lhe Treaty. 
A Governor may be relieved from office only if he no longer fulfils 
the conditions required for the performance of his duties or if he 
has been guilty of serious misconduct... " 
By each of these four provisions, limits are put on national central 
bank legislation: 
• The prohibitions and obligations formulated in Article 107 
apply equally to both the ECB and the NCBs in so far as the 
performance of ESCB-related tasks is concerned. While the 
prohibitions formulated in the first sentence of Article 107 are 
addressed to the NCBs and to their decision-making bodies, it 
appears that rights of third parties to give instructions in some 
form or other are incompatible with the prohibitions. Further-
more, any national provisions of which the purpose or effect is 
for the government to seek to influence the members of the de-
cision-making bodies of the NCB in the performance of their 
tasks therefore need to be brought in line with the second sen-
tence of Article 107. The term "decision-making bodies" 
should be understood to mean any organ of an NCB whose de-
cisions may have an impact on the fulfilment of its ESCB-re-
lated tasks. 
• The primary objective formulated in Article 105(1) is as-
signed to the ESCB. which according to Article 1.2 of the Stat-
ute is composed of the ECB and the NCBs. Therefore, the ob-
jective of each member of the ESCB must be compatible with 
Article 105(1). 
• Article 14.2 of the ESCB Statute is exclusively addressed to 
NCBs; non-compliance with the limits set therein will require 
adaptations of national law. 
• Apart from these specific provisions in the Treaty and the 
Statute which require compatibility, there are likely to exist a 
number of national provisions - often of a technical nature -
which may prove to be at odds with the prerogatives of the 
ECB vis-à-vis NCBs and which should be eliminated so that 
the new compatible provisions become effective at the start of 
Stage Three for Member States without a derogation and at the 
start of their full participation in Monetary Union for Member 
States with a derogation initially or with a special status. 
It is worth recalling some provisions which refer to the time-
frame for any adjustments of national law and to the geographical 
coverage of the respective rules. Right from its establishment in 
early 1998, the ECB will have to take decisions which predeter-
mine the conduct of its monetary policy as from 1 January 1999. 
Article 108 therefore stipulates that compatibility shall be 
achieved at this date at the latest. Besides, Article 109e(5) calls 
upon Member States, as appropriate, to start the process leading 
to the independence of its central bank during the second stage. 
In relation to the application of Article 107 of the Treaty on central 
bank independence and Article 108 of the Treaty on the adapta-
tion of national legislation and NCBs' statutes, the Treaty does 
not make a distinction between Member States with or without a 
derogation (see Article 109k(3) of the Treaty). 
Denmark will be treated as a Member State with a derogation (Ar-
ticle 2, Protocol No 12). Its central bank statute will therefore 
have to be compatible with Articles 107 and 108. 
In the event that the United Kingdom will not participate in Stage 
Three, Article 2, Protocol No 11 will exempt the United King-
dom from the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty. 
Given the formulation of Article 109e(5), until it notifies that it 
intends to move to the third stage, the United Kingdom is there-
fore exempted from the obligation to start the process leading to 
the independence of its central bank. 
It is made clear in Article 107 that the requirements for compati-
bility with the Treaty and the Statute are limited to ESCB-related 
tasks. Among these are the basic tasks, laid down in Ar-
ticle 105(2) of the Treaty and Article 3.1 of the Statute, which are 
to define and implement the monetary policy of the Community, 
to conduct foreign exchange operations consistent with the provi-
sions of Article 109 of the Treaty, to hold and manage the official 
foreign reserves of the Member States and to promote the smooth 
operation of payment systems. 
2.3. Review of national legislation 
Central bank statutes reflect different national traditions and insti-
tutional frameworks and vary significantly between Member 
States with respect to many of their characteristics like the legal 
form of the central bank, the definition of its objectives and tasks, 
monetary policy instruments, relations with the national parlia-
ment and socio-economic groups, the structure and composition 
of decision-making bodies, and financial rules. Taking Ar-
ticles 105 and 107 of the Treaty and Article 14.2 of the ESCB 
Statute as benchmarks, a review of present legislation in the 
Member States leads to the following conclusion: Many charac-
teristics of national legislation are within the limits drawn by EC 
law. However, in a number of cases adaptations are called for. 
Legislative initiatives for such adaptations have reached an ad-
vanced stage in several Member States (see section 2.4). 
In a few Member States, legislation allows other bodies to give 
instructions to the central bank in matters of monetary policy. 
This is incompatible with the requirements in the third stage of 
EMU. 
In many Member States, other legislative provisions are in force 
the effect of which may come close to the right of third parties to 
give straightforward instructions. Such provisions include a right 
of other bodies to interfere in a decision taken by the ECB, a right 
to participate in the voting on monetary policy, a right to be con-
sulted before the central bank takes a decision, insufficient finan-
cial autonomy of the central bank, or membership in decision-
making bodies of the central bank and in bodies outside the 
ESCB. In some cases, the borderline between compatible and 
non-compatible provisions is difficult to draw; however, it is 
clear that most of the existing provisions of this type need to be 
amended. 
In a few Member States, the provisions on the security of tenure 
for the Governor are not compatible with the provisions of Article 
14.2 of the ESCB Statute. 
The box on "Review of central bank legislation: some illustrative 
cases" provides examples of provisions in national legislation 
which serve to illustrate the issues at stake. 
2.4. Current legislative initiatives 
In Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Finland and - with a 
more substantial revision than in 1993 - in Belgium, preparatory 
work on amendments to national legislation concerning central 
banking is well under way. 
In Ireland, draft legislation on the Central Bank of Ireland in-
cludes provisions on the Bank's involvement in payment systems, 
the collection of statistics, prudential supervision and the position 
of the members of decision-making bodies, including the term of 
office of Directors, which is fixed at five years. 
In Luxembourg, a draft law on the Institut Monétaire Luxembour-
geois and the monetary status of Luxembourg was submitted to 
Parliament in December 1993. The law which is still pending cov-
ers inter alia the IML's objectives and tasks. 
In the Netherlands, discussions between the Ministry of Finance 
and the Nederlandsche Bank with a view to adapting the central 
bank legislation to the requirements of EMU have reached an ad-
vanced stage. 
In Finland, draft legislation in particular addresses the future role 
of the Parliamentary Supervisory Council in monetary policy, the 
minimum term of office for the Governor and the grounds for dis-
missal. 
In Belgium, the government is planning to propose a comprehen-
sive reform of central bank legislation in the near future. The draft 
law aims at compatibility between the Treaty and the ESCB Stat-
ute on the one side and the statute of the National Bank of Belgium 
on the other. 
Box l:Review Of Central Bank Legislation:Some Illustrative Cases 
Compliance with Article 107 of the Treaty 
The following rights of third parties seem to be at odds with or 
to impinge upon the prohibitions and commitments formu-
lated in Article 107: 
a. A general right to give instructions 
Provisions which subordinate NCBs to instructions are in 
contradiction with their obligation not to seek or take in-
structions. 
Section 4 of the Bank of England Act2 
"The Treasury may from time to time give such directions 
to the Bank as, after consultation with the Governor of the 
Bank, they think necessary in the public interest. " 
The right to give such instructions is also incompatible 
with the Treaty, when the central bank may object but 
eventually can be defeated. 
Article 26 of De Nederlandsche Bank Act 
"I. The Minister may, after consultation with the Bank 
Council, give such directions to the Governing Board as 
he thinks necessary for the Bank's policy to be properly 
co-ordinated with the Government's monetary and finan-
cial policies. Except as provided in paragraph 2 below, 
the Governing Board shall comply with such directions. 
2. If the Governing Board has any objections to the direc-
tions as referred to in paragraph 1 above, it may commu-
nicate said objections to the Crown in writing within three 
days of receiving directions. The Crown shall decide 
whether or not the directions are to be complied with. 
3. (...) 
4. If the Crown decides that the directions are to be com-
plied with, the Governing Board's objections and the deci-
sions of the Crown shall be published in the Neder-
landsche Staatscourant, if in the opinion of the Crown this 
is not contrary to the national interest. " 
Article 15 of the Act on the Bank of Finland 
"The administration of the Bank and management of the 
affairs thereof shall be under the surveillance of the Par-
liamentary Supeivisoiy Board in accordance with this Act 
and the Regulations confirmed by Parliament" 
Article 17 of the same Act 
"It is the duty of the Parliamentary Supervisoiy Board 
to fix the base rate of the bank and other rates of interest 
applied by the bank and the limits thereof". 
b. A right to approve, suspend, annul or defer a NCB's deci-
sion 
Any such provisions constitute a right to give instruc-
tions of a specific type; the assessment is the same as for 
generally formulated rights to give instructions. 
Article 13(2) of the Bundesbank Act 
"The members of the Federal Cabinet are entitled to 
attend the meetings of the Central Bank Council. They 
have no right to vote, but may propose motions. At their 
request, a decision shall be deferred for up to two weeks. " 
c. A right to censor decisions on legal grounds 
A right of the Government to control the legality of deci-
sions of a central bank seems incompatible with Article 
107. This also applies when the Government's right can 
only be exerted indirectly. 
Article 43 of the Organic Law of the Banco de Portugal 
"1. The Governor shall have a casting vote at the meeting 
which he chairs and may suspend the effectiveness of the 
decisions taken by the Board of Directors or by executive 
committees which, in his judgement, are contrary to the 
law, to the interests of the country or of the bank. 
2. The suspension shall be notified to the Government, 
through the Finance Minister, and shall be considered 
waived, should the Cabinet not confirm it within fifteen 
days after its imposition. " 
d. A right to participate in decision-making bodies of a NCB 
with a right to vote. 
A right of third parties to vote in decisions related to the 
tasks of the ESCB as defined in Article 105(2) is inconsis-
tent with their commitment not to seek to influence such 
decisions. 
Article 14 of the Central Bank Act of Ireland 
"The Bank shall be conducted and managed in accor-
dance with this Act by a Board of Directors consisting of 
(a) a Governor and (b) such number of other Directors 
(not exceeding nine and not including at any time more 
than two service Directors) as the Minister shall from time 
to time determine.... Every service Director shall hold of-
fice at the pleasure of the Minister and may be removed by 
the Minister at any time. " 
2 As already indicated, the provisions of Protocol No 11 exempt the United King-
dom from the application of Article 107, unless the United Kingdom notifies 
that it intends to move to the third stage. 
- 5 
e. A right to be consulted before a NCB takes a decision 
Article 107 of the Treaty does not, of course, preclude 
cooperation and dialogue between NCBs and govern-
ment, parliament or other state bodies. In fact the Treaty 
provides for such contacts and reporting in a number of 
provisions. The point is whether the government avails 
itself of any formal mechanism of which the purpose is to 
influence the final decision of the NCB. An explicit duty 
to consult political bodies prior to the decision provides 
for such a mechanism and appears not to be compatible 
with the second sentence of Article 107. 
Article 42 of Sveriges Riksbank Act 
" Prior to the Riksbank making a monetary policy deci-
sion of major importance, the Cabinet Minister ap-
pointed by the Government shall be consulted. If such 
consultation is not possible and there is exceptional 
cause, the Riksbank may make such a decision without 
consultation. " 
f. A right to control ex ante the central bank's budget 
As for the previous point, the borderline between 
constraints to which NCBs must be subjected and at-
tempts to influence the members of their decision-mak-
ing bodies in the performance of their tasks is not easy to 
draw in each case. A NCB must, of course, be financially 
accountable. On the other hand, a requirement to have its 
budget approved beforehand may create a situation 
where a NCB is unable to avail itself autonomously of 
the appropriate means to fulfil its mandate. 
Article 4.2 of the Law of Autonomy of the Banco de Es-
paña 
"The Bank's draft budget for operating expenses and in-
vestments, once approved by its Governing Council ac-
cording to Article 21. lg), shall be submitted to the Gov-
ernment, which will send it to the Spanish parliament for 
approval. The Bank's budget shall be estimative in na-
ture, and shall not be consolidated with other state public 
sector budgets. " 
g. Membership of members of decision-making bodies in 
bodies outside the ESCB 
Membership in external bodies may entail conflicts of 
interests between the duties vis-à-vis a NCB (for Gover-
nors additionally vis-à-vis the ECB) and the external 
function. However, it appears to be difficult to establish a 
general rule with respect to compliance or non-com-
pliance of such membership with Article 107. The point 
in question is whether the member of the NCB body 
executes other tasks which might jeopardise his personal 
independence. 
Article 22 of the Österreichische Nationalbank Act 
"(3) Only persons holding Austrian citizenship who are 
not debarred from being elected to the National Council 
(Nationalrat) may be members of the General Council. 
The members of the General Council shall be persons 
prominent in some branch of economic activity or jurists 
or economists. They shall include representatives of: 
1. banks;, 
2. industry; 
3. trade and small businesses; 
4. agriculture; and 
5. salaried employees and wage-earners. 
(4) No person who is in the active service of the Federal 
Republic or a Land or who is a member of the National-
rat, the Federal Government or the government of a 
Land may be a member of the General Council. The re-
striction with regard to persons in the active service of 
the Federal Republic shall not apply to university profes-
sors in law and economics. Not more than four members 
of the General Council may in their main occupation be 
a member of the management of banks; such persons 
may not be a President or Vice President of the Bank." 
Compliance with Article 14.2 of the ESCB Statute 
In Article 14.2 of the statute, the security of tenure for Gov-
ernors is addressed under the aspect of their term of office 
and the grounds of their dismissal. 
a. Term of office for Governors 
Article 14.2 of the Statute requires a minimum term of 
office for Governors, i.e. five years. Consequently, stat-
utes with a shorter term of office need to be revised. 
Statutes which do not explicitly provide for a minimum 
term of office meet the minimum term requirement, pro-
vided that the grounds for dismissal are limited to the 
cases specified in the second sub—paragraph of Article 
14.2 of the Statute (see below). 
Article 29 of the statutes of the Bank of Greece 
"The Governor and the Deputy Governors (...) shall be 
appointed (...) by an Act of the Cabinet, for a period of 
four years on proposal of the Board of Directors of the 
Bank (...)." 
The statute of the Banca d'Italia is silent about the term 
of office of the Governor and about grounds for dismiss-
al. 
Article 19 of the Statute of the Banca d'Italia 
"The Board of Directors may appoint and dismiss the 
Governor, the General Manager and the two Deputy 
General Managers. " 
Article 7(3) of the Bundesbank Act 
"The President, the Vice—President and the other mem-
bers of the Directorate are nominated by the Federal 
Cabinet and appointed by the President of the Federal 
Republic. Before making such nominations, the Federal 
Cabinet shall consult the Central Bank Council. Mem-
bers of the Directorate are appointed for eight years, or 
in exceptional cases for a shorter term of office, but not 
less than two years. " 
b. Grounds for dismissal of a Governor 
Article 14.2 of the Statute seeks to avoid the arbitrary 
dismissal of the Governor by the authorities involved in 
the appointment procedure. As in this case the Statute 
contains an explicit requirement on the content of nation-
al legislation, any contradictory provision would have to 
be amended. 
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Article 12(3) of the Act on the establishment of the Institut 
Monétaire Luxembourgeois 
"The Government may propose to the Grand-Duke the dis-
missal of the Management if there is a fundamental dis-
agreement between the Government and the Management 
over the policy of the Institut and the performance of its 
tasks. In this event, the proposal of dismissal shall relate to 
the Management collectively. Likewise, the Government 
may propose to the Grand-Duke the dismissal of a member 
of the Management who becomes permanently unable to 
perform his duties. Before transmitting a proposal to the 
Grand-Duke, the Government shall consult the Council of 
the Institut. " 
Article 44 of the Statutes of the National Bank of Belgium 
"The governor is appointed and can be dismissed or sus-
pended by the King. " 
Compliance with Article 105 of the Treaty 
The requirement that the objectives of all members of the 
ESCB must coincide with Article 105(1) does not imply the 
need to copy in all instances the wording of this paragraph into 
national statutes. In fact, the formulation of a central bank's ob-
jectives is quite disparate among Member States. This to some 
extent reflects the fact that central bank statutes date from dif-
ferent decades. However, any formulation must avoid casting 
doubt as to whether the bank in question is bound by the prima-
ry objective as laid down in the Treaty. 
Article 1 Act n. 116 on Danmarks National bank3 
"Danmarks. Nationalbank shall have the object to main-
tain a safe and secure currency system in this country, and 
to facilitate and regulate the traffic in money and the exten-
sion of credit. " 
Further statutory requirements to be fulfilled for NCBs to be-
come an integral part of the ESCB 
According to Article 14.3 of the Statute, national central banks 
are an integral part of the ESCB and shall act in accordance 
with the guidelines and instructions of the ECB. The scope of 
necessary adaptations of national law - either in central bank 
statutes or in other parts of law - which this principle implies 
will emerge more clearly in the process of preparatory work for 
the ECB's regulatory framework. It is obvious that national pe-
culiarities may continue to exist to the extent that the effective-
ness and uniformity of the single monetary policy are not af-
fected. 
An example where national statutory provisions do not respect 
the prerogatives of the ECB are rules which provide for com-
petencies of government bodies in the process of issuing bank-
notes. 
3 Since Denmark has notified the Council that it will not participate in the third 
stage, there is no need to adapt the statute of Danmarks Nationalbank in this re-
spect. 
3. PRICE STABILITY 
3.1. Treaty provisions 
The price stability criterion is defined in the first indent of Ar-
ticle 109j(l) of the Treaty: "The achievement of a high degree of 
price stability [...] will be apparent from a rate of inflation which 
is close to that of, at most, the three best performing Member 
States in terms of price stability. " 
Protocol No 6 on the convergence criteria develops Article 
109j( 1 ), by stipulating in Article 1 that a Member State is conver-
gent in terms of inflation if it "has a price performance that is sus-
tainable and an average rate of inflation, observed over a period 
of one year before the examination, that does not exceed by more 
than 1V2 percentage points that of, at most, the three best per-
forming Member States in terms of price stability. Inflation shall 
be measured by means of the consumer price index on a compara-
ble basis, taking into account differences in national definitions. " 
National consumer price indices (CPIs) diverge substantially in 
terms of concepts, methods and practices. Thus, to meet the re-
quirement of Protocol No 6 that inflation must be measured on a 
comparable basis, the Council adopted on 23 October 1995 a 
framework Regulation (No 2494/95) which provides for a har-
monisation of national CPIs in two steps. 
The first step required for the purpose of the report referred to in 
Article 109j(l), i.e. the present document, was the production by 
March 1996 of a set of so-called "interim indices of consumer 
prices" (IICPs), adjusted to reduce differences in coverage of 
goods and services observed between existing national indices. 
The monthly IICPs have been published as from January 1996 
with the time series going back to January 1994. As a first step in 
the harmonisation process, IICPs exclude those categories of the 
national indices for which existing practices differ most markedly 
across Member States. As such, IICPs do not include imputed 
rents of owner-occupied housing, health and educational ser-
vices, and various other items like mortgage interest payments, fi-
nancial services, insurance, package holidays and certain local 
authority services. On the other hand, IICPs incorporate some 
components, such as prices of alcohol and tobacco, which are ex-
cluded from the national CPIs in some Member States. Though 
not strictly comparable, IICPs are for the time being considered to 
constitute a more comparable basis for the assessment of inflation 
convergence among Member States than the national CPIs. 
The second step, scheduled for January 1997, will be the launch 
of comparable harmonised indices (HICPs) based on common 
definitions and methods such as the use of a common coverage of 
goods and services for all Member States and harmonisation of 
the reference period, standards for sampling, frequency of updat-
ing weights, demographic and geographical coverage, etc. 
3.2. Price stability as assessed by the IICPs 
3.2.1 Recent trends 
The time series for the IICPs are available only from January 
1994. As a result, the analysis of the inflation trend based on this 
index cannot start before January 1995. Since early 1995, a gener-
al tendency towards lower and more convergent inflation has pre-
vailed. Inflation in the Community as a whole as measured by the 
IICP (percentage change on a year earlier) stood at 2.8% in Janu-
ary 1995 and declined to 2.4% in September 1996. This figure is 
historically low and not far from what could be called price 
stability. 
GRAPH 3.1: IICP for EUR15 and Member States 
(percentage change on a year earlier, T/T-12) 
Apr. Jul. 
96 
Source: Commission services. 
In the seven Member States where the annual inflation rate was 
below 2.5% in January 1995 (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, 
France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Finland), the pace of 
price increases either eased further or stabilised at a low level dur-
ing the subsequent 20 months (see Graph 3.1). In three of the four 
countries where the annual inflation rate ranged between 2.5% 
and 3% at the beginning of 1995 (Ireland, Austria and Sweden, 
the exception being the United Kingdom), it edged down to be-
low 2% in mid-1996. The deceleration was most noticeable in 
Sweden where the annual inflation rate eased to below 1% since 
August of this year. In the United Kingdom, progress towards 
price stability has proved to be gradual and somewhat erratic, but 
the downward trend has been confirmed during the course of 
1996, despite the context of a sustained recovery and earlier 
downward pressure on sterling. 
In the remaining Member States, visible progress has been 
achieved with inflation performance, but the degree of price sta-
bility and price convergence is not yet satisfactory. Spain and Ita-
ly experienced a worrying upward movement in inflation during 
the first half of 1995 due to both the surge in import prices follow-
ing the marked depreciation of their currencies in the spring and 
increases in indirect taxation. However, in both countries infla-
tion peaked in the middle of 1995 and since then a steady down-
ward trend has been clearly discernible. Inflation stood at 3.5% in 
Italy and at 3.6% in Spain in September of this year.But in Spain 
the deceleration in inflation has stalled in recent months, al-
though underlying inflation (excluding prices of unprocessed 
food and energy) has continued to edge down. An upward blip in 
inflation also took place in Portugal in the spring of last year, but 
the upturn was much smaller and reversed more quickly than in 
the previous two countries. However, after having eased to close 
to 2% in March of this year, inflation has accelerated in recent 
months, reaching 3.2% in September. In Greece, inflation has de-
clined from 10.9% in January 1995 to 8.1% in September 1996, 
but it is still well above the Community average. 
3.2.2 Price convergence measured against a reference value 
In this report, the following operational definitions have been 
used (for a discussion of the issues involved see the box on the 
"Calculation of the inflation reference value"). A Member State's 
inflation is measured by the percentage change in the arithmetic 
average of twelve monthly indices relative to the arithmetic aver-
age of the twelve monthly indices of the previous period'. The 
reference value is calculated as the arithmetic average of the infla-
tion rates of the three best performing Member States plus 
1.5 percentage points. 
Over the period for which a reference value can be calculated2, the 
reference value declined marginally from 2.7% in Decem-
ber 1995 to 2.6% in September 1996 (see Table 3.1). Over the 
It should be noted that this measure is different from that usually referred to as the 
inflation rate (calculated as the percentage change in an index in the latest month 
over the index of 12 months before), which has been used in Section 3.2.1. and 
Graph 3.1. 
The time series for the IICP are available only from January 1994. As a result, 
the earliest reference value which can be calculated is for December 1995. 
TABLE 3.1: 
Three 
best 
performers 
Inflation convergence 
(inflation measured by the 
in the IICP) 
Β 
I) 
NL 
FIN 
Reference value12' 
Number: 
out of: 
Β 
DK 
D 
I 
I R L 3 
I. 
NL 
Λ 
FIN 
S 
perce 
Interi 
ntage change 
■n indices of 
consumer pnces 
December 1995" 
1.4 
­
1.1 
1.0 
2.7 
September 1996<" 
­
1.3 
1.2 
0.9 
2.6 
Member States respecting the reference 
value 
9 
15 
1.4 
2.3 
1.5 
1.7 
2.4 
1.9 
1.1 
2.0 
1.0 
­
10 
15 
1.6 
2.2 
1.3 
2.1 
2.1 
1.3 
1.2 
1.7 
0.9 
1.6 
( 1 ) Measured by the percentage change in the arithmetic average of twelve month­
ly indices relative to the arithmetic average of the twelve monthly indices of 
the previous period. 
(2) Definition adopted in this report: arithmetic average of the three best 
performers in terms of inflation plus 1.5 percentage points. 
(3) Measured on the basis of quarterly data 
Source: Commission services. 
T A B L E 3.2 : 
Β 
DK 
D 
EL 
E 
F 
I R L 2 
I 
L 
NL 
A 
Ρ 
FIN 
S 
UK 
EUR 
( 1) Measured by 
indices relato 
vious period. 
(2) Measured on 
Source: 
The average rate of inflation 
(measured by IICP; percentage change) 
Interim indices of 
December 1995" > 
1.4 
2.3 
1.5 
9.0 
4.7 
1.7 
2.4 
5.4 
1.9 
1.1 
2.0 
3.8 
1.0 
2.9 
3.1 
3.0 
the percentage change in the arithmetic 
'e to the arithmetic average of the twelve 
the basis of quarterly data 
Commission services. 
:onsumer pnees 
September 1996") 
1.6 
2.2 
1.3 
8.4 
3.8 
2.1 
2.1 
4.7 
1.3 
1.2 
1.7 
3.0 
0.9 
1.6 
3.0 
2.7 
average of twelve monthly 
monthly indices of the pre­
period concerned, the composition of the reference group of the 
three best performers shows little change. The Netherlands and 
Finland have invariably been part of the group whereas Germany 
replaced Belgium as from June 1996. 
In September 1996, ten Member States had an average inflation 
rate below the reference value (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, 
France, Ireland3, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland 
and Sweden), while in two other countries (Portugal and the 
United Kingdom), the average inflation rate was 0.4 percentage 
points above the reference value. In Spain and Italy, the average 
inflation rate exceeded the reference value by 1.2 percentage 
points and 2.1 percentage points, respectively. In the case of 
Greece, the gap from the reference value amounted to 5.8 per­
centage points (see Table 3.2) 
The convergence situation was better in September 1996 than in 
December 1995, when nine countries enjoyed average inflation 
rates below the reference value, and when the distance from the 
reference value in the other countries was larger than is currently 
the case. 
GRAPH 3.2: Interim indices of consumer prices (IICP) 
(Arithmetic average of twelve monthly indices relative to the arithmetic average of the twelve monthly indices of the preceding period) 
Percentage change 
Β DK D EL F K L I L N L A P F I N S U K 
* Average of 3 best performers + 1.5 percentage points. 
Source .'Commission services 
3.3. Inflation performance during the second 
stage of EMU 
The limited time­span covered by the IICPs does not allow more 
recent inflation developments to be seen in perspective. To ensure 
a comprehensive and balanced examination of the degree of price 
stability and the sustainability of the inflation performance, some 
other inflation indicators must be considered, including private 
consumption deflators and CPIs. The box on the "Differences be­
tween IICPs and CPIs" examines the scale of such differences. 
Developments with regard to private consumption deflators and 
CPIs confirm that substantial progress in inflation convergence 
has been achieved in the Community since the start of Stage Two 
of EMU on 1 January 1994. Between 1993 and 1995, inflation for 
the Community as a whole, fell from 4% to 3%, as measured by 
the private consumption deflator, and from 3Vá% to 3%, as mea­
sured by the CPI. This downward trend has continued in 1996. 
with inflation in the Community on average expected to be just 
over 21/2% on both measures this year (see Table 3.3). 
At the country level, the picture painted by the evolution of the 
private consumption deflator and the CPI is similar to that out­
lined by the IICPs. The decline in inflation is observed in all the 
Community countries, although to varying degrees. During Stage 
Two, Member States which have long participated in the ex­
change­rate mechanism (ERM) (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, 
France, Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) have consoli­
3 For Ireland the IICP and national CP1 are only available quarterly. 
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dated their already good initial inflation performances, while the 
three new Member States (Austria, Finland and Sweden) have 
converged in terms of price stability towards this first group. 
In the United Kingdom, the CPI evolution is strongly influenced 
by movements in mortgage rates. The latter largely explains the 
drop to 1.69c in 1993 and the subsequent rise to 3.5% up to 1995. 
Again, most of the slowdown in the CPI inflation during the first 
half of 1996 is due to the fall in mortgage rates. However, the pri­
vate consumption deflator showed an easing in inflation from 
3.5% in 1993 to 2.6% in 1995. and it is expected to be slightly low­
er in 1996. 
T A B L E 3.3 
Β 
DK 
D 
EL 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
A 
Ρ 
FIN 
S 
UK 
EUR 
CV 
CV ERM 
CV 
Non-ERM 
Private consumption deflator and consumer 
index (national currency, percentage change) 
Private consumption 
93 
3.0 
0.3 
3.9 
13.7 
5.5 
2.2 
1.9 
5.4 
7.0 
2.1 
3.4 
7.1 
4.2 
5.7 
3.5 
4.1 
0.73 
0.62 
0.59 
94 
3.2 
1.7 
2.7 
10.x 
4.9 
2.1 
2.6 
4.6 
2.4 
2.7 
3.0 
4.S 
1.4 
3.1 
2.5 
3.3 
0.63 
0.35 
0.59 
95 
l.d 
2.1 
2.0 
9.3 
4.7 
1.7 
2.0 
5.8 
2.0 
0.9 
2.3 
4.2 
0.2 
2.7 
2.0 
3.0 
0.75 
0.48 
0.76 
def. 
96"» 
2.0 
2.0 
1.8 
X.5 
3.6 
1.9 
2.0 
3.9 
1.7 
1.9 
2.0 
3.3 
0.9 
1.7 
2.5 
2.6 
0.66 
0.34 
0.63 
Consumer 
93 
2.8 
1.3 
3.6 
14.4 
4.6 
2.1 
1.4 
4.5 
3.6 
2.6 
3.6 
6.4 
2.2 
4.6 
1.6 
3.4 
0.85 
0.49 
o.si 
94 
2.4 
2.0 
2.7 
10.9 
4.7 
1.7 
2.3 
4.0 
2.2 
2.8 
3.0 
5.2 
1.1 
2.2 
2.5 
3.1 
0.68 
0.40 
0.63 
price 
price index 
45 
1.5 
2.1 
1.8 
9.3 
4.7 
l.S 
2.6 
5.2 
1.9 
1.9 
2.2 
4.1 
1.0 
2.5 
3.4 
3.1 
0.66 
0.41 
0.67 
Sep. 
% ( 2 ) 
1.8 
2.0 . 
1.6 
8.6 
3.8 
2.1 
1.8 
4.6 
1.3 
1.9 
1.8 
3.3 
0.5 
1.2 
2.6 
2.7 
0.74 
0.43 
0.66 
( 1 ) Autumn 1996 economic forecasts. 
(2) Measured by the percentage change in the arithmetic average of twelve month­
ly indices relative to arithmetic average of the twelve monthly indices of the 
previous period. 
CV = Coefficient of variation (ratio of the standard deviation to the mean of the 
data). 
CV ERM is the coefficient of variation for ; B, DK. D. E. F. IRL, L. NL. Ρ for 
1993 and 1994. A is included in 1995 and 1996. FIN is included in 1996. 
The Non­ERM includes EL. I. UK for 1993 and 1994. FIN and S are included in 
the CV Non­ERM for 1995 and S also for 1996. 
Source : Commission services 
In the remaining Member States (Spain, Greece, Italy and Portu­
gal), a clear improvement has been observed since 1993, but in 
Spain and Portugal the downward trend in inflation was inter­
rupted in the spring of 1996. 
The generalised reduction in inflation throughout the Community 
has been accompanied by a narrowing in inflation differentials 
between Member States. One indication of how inflation in the 
Member States has tended to converge is provided by the coeffi­
cient of variation4 , a statistical measure of dispersion. The coeffi­
cient of variation for inflation, measured by the private consump­
tion deflator, declined from 0.73 in 1993 to 0.66 in 1996 for the 
Community as a whole. The convergence process has been even 
greater within the ERM group, with the coefficient of variation 
declining from 0.62 in 1993 to 0.34 in 1996. On the other hand, 
substantially greater variability continues to characterise infla­
tion within the non­ERM group. 
3.4. The sustainability of price convergence 
The process of inflation convergence which has been evident i 
the Community for more than a decade results in large part froi 
fundamental changes in the attitude of all economic actors t( 
wards inflation. 
The most important structural change has undoubtedly been tr 
determined implementation of monetary policies targeted at prit 
stability. Several Member States have adopted explicit inflatie 
targets, or indirect objectives (like a money growth target or ¿ 
exchange rate target), and accordingly they have conducted the 
monetary policies credibly. 
Institutional changes such as the prohibition of central bank f 
nancing of budget deficits and the prohibition of privileged acce: 
of the public sector to financial institutions (which entered ini 
force with the start of Stage Two) as well as the granting of indi 
pendence to central banks (as required by the Treaty by the end ι 
Stage Two, see Chapter 2) have helped to strengthen the effei 
tiveness and credibility of a stability­oriented monetary policy 
the Member States. 
Besides its direct effect on inflation, monetary policy also exerts 
curbing impact on price increases through its influence on ec< 
nomic agents' behaviour. By remaining firm on an anti­inflatk 
policy, monetary authorities raise the credibility of price stabilii 
objectives and strongly contribute to reduce inflation expect; 
tions. Nominal wage moderation has been progressively achieve 
over the past ten years (see section 7.4.1). This trend suggests th 
the Social Partners have increasingly internalised the price­st; 
bility objective in their wage settlements. 
But other key structural factors have contributed importantly I 
the low inflation environment currently prevailing in the Con 
munity. The completion of the single market has exerted ­ ar 
will continue to do so ­ downward pressure on price inflation 
the firm and sectoral level mainly through two channels. Firstl 
the removal of national trade barriers has increased competitie 
in many markets for goods and services, with a subsequei 
squeeze of rents which resulted from imperfect market situation 
Secondly, greater competition has also induced a more efficie 
allocation of resources within the Community, fostering the eff 
ciency of the supply side. Production costs have thus been curbe 
with an obvious downward impact on prices. 
Since the 1980s, most Member States have re­oriented their but 
getary policy. The use of discretionary budgetary instruments f< 
regulating economic activity has been increasingly regarded ; 
inefficient and even damaging, as persistent excessive defici 
and the accumulation of public debt have been accompanied b 
serious adverse supply­side and inflation effects. Initially, ti 
success of budgetary consolidation policies was mixed, but, 
recent years, efforts to reduce budget deficits have intensified ar 
have proved to be more credible, as examined in Chapter 4. TI 
shift towards greater budgetary discipline, aimed at balance 
positions in the medium term, has fostered low and stable infl, 
tionary expectations, thereby facilitating the task of monetai 
policy to achieve and maintain price stability with lower intere 
rates. 
Beside structural factors, cyclical forces have also helped to brir 
about the current favourable inflation performance in the Con 
munity. The persistence of output levels below full capacity hi 
exerted a strong disincentive for companies to raise prices or ι 
allow significant wage increases. 
4 The coefficient of variation shows the dispersion of individual Member State's inf 
tion around the average rate of inflation for each year; the higher the value, the gre 
er the dispersion of inflation in any given year. 
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Box 2 : Calculation of the inflation reference value 
Protocol No 6 states that the inflation reference value should be 
calculated on the basis of "an average rate of inflation, observed 
over a period of one year of, at most, the three best performing 
States ". 
As to the question of the average, in this report preference is given 
to an arithmetic average as opposed to a geometric one as it is the 
most commonly used method. Furthermore, the difference be-
tween the arithmetic and geometric average is very small, espe-
cially if inflation is low. 
Regarding the period of one year, two main approaches are pos-
sible: either using the year-on-year change of a monthly indica-
tor (for instance, September 1996/September 1995), or using the 
average change of the last twelve months over the preceding 
twelve months. The advantage of the first approach is that it is 
straightforward and easy understandable. But disadvantages out-
weigh this advantage. Indeed, results may vary importantly from 
month to month, because of possible base effects due for instance 
to changes in indirect taxes. Furthermore, and more importantly, 
as the criterion should assess the sustainability of price stability 
and of inflation convergence, taking into account a longer period 
seems more appropriate. 
Concerning the number of countries to be included in the calcula-
tion of the reference value, different approaches are conceivable. 
A first group takes one country to calculate the reference value: 
Method 1 : the best performing country +1.5 percentagepoints. 
Method 2 : the second best performing country +1.5 percent-
age points. 
Method 3 : the third best performing country +1.5 percentage 
points. 
A second group of interpretations would take an average of two or 
three countries: 
Method 4: an unweighted average of the two best performing 
countries +1.5 percentage points. 
Method 5: the unweighted average of the three best performing 
countries +1.5 percentage points. 
Method 6: a weighted average of the three best performing 
countries +1.5 percentage points. 
TABLE 3.4; Inflation convergence according to alternative 
methods for the calculation of the reference value, 
IICP 
1. The best performing 
country + 1.5 % points. 
2. The 2nd best perform-
ing country + 1.5 9c 
points. 
3. The 3rd best performing 
country + 1.5 % points. 
4. The 2 best performing 
countries, unweichted 
average + 1.5 % points. 
5. The 3 best performing 
countries, unweighted 
average + 1.5 % points. 
6. The 3 best performing 
countries, weighted (2) 
average + 1.5 % points. 
( 1 ) Measured by the percentage 
December 1995(1) 
Ref. 
value 
2 s 
2.6 
2 9 
2.5 
2.7 
2.7 
change in ft 
indices relative to the arithmetic average 
vious period. 
Number of 
member 
stales re-
specting 
the ref. 
value (3) 
9 
y 
c; 
9 
9 
9 
e arithmetic avt 
September 1996(1). 
Ref. 
value 
2 4 
2.7 
2 H 
2.6 
2.6 
2.8 
Number of 
member 
states re-
specting 
the ref. 
value(3) 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
¡rage of twelve monthly 
of the twelve monthly indices of die pre-
(2) Weighted according to shares of private consumption in 1995 at current prices. 
PPS. 
(3) 9 countries respecting the reference value 
NL. A. FIN. 
in December 1995: B. DK, D, F. IRL. L. 
10 countries respecting the reference value in September 
L, NL, A, FIN, S. 
Source : Commission services. 
1996: B. 3K, D, F, IRL. 
A reference value has been calculated according to these six 
methods both for December 1995 and for September 1996. For 
the purpose of this report, the Commission has adopted method 5. 
Table 3.4 shows that the number of countries with inflation below 
the reference value is the same, both in December 1995 and in 
September 1996, whatever the method used. 
These results may be explained by two factors. First, there is an 
important group of countries which has achieved low and conver-
gent inflation in a sustained way. As a result, neither the number 
of countries taken into account nor the composition of the refer-
ence group has a major effect on the magnitude of the reference 
value. Secondly, the inflation performance of the remaining 
Member States is still too distant from the low inflation group 
such that small variations in the reference value do not allow these 
countries to be below the reference value. 
Box 3: Differences between IICPs and CPIs 
The differences between IICPs and CPIs depend very much on the 
existing structure of national CPIs. 
For countries where the CPIs incorporate items like health care or 
imputed rents on owner-occupied housing, the IICPs will tend to 
be lower than the CPIs as the prices of these items tend to rise fast-
er than those of internationally traded goods. On the other hand, 
for countries where alcohol and tobacco prices are excluded from 
the CPIs, the difference with the IICPs will be positive as price 
increases on these goods are typically higher than average. Coun-
tries where mortgages are included in the national CPIs will see 
erratic differentials. At the Community level and for a number of 
countries, differences between the CPI and the IICP are minor, 
with the discrepancy in the range of ±0.1 percentage point to 
±0.3 percentage point (see Table 3.5). But for some countries, 
differences vary from ±xh percentage point to nearly 1 percent-
age point (Ireland, the Netherlands, Finland, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom). 
(continued on page 11) 
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TABLE 3.5 : Difference between IICPs and CPIs ( percentage change) 
lì 
DK 
D 
EL 
E 
F 
I R L 3 
I. 
NL 
A 
Ρ 
FIN 
S 
UK 
EUR 
( 1 ) Annual percentage change. 
(2) Percentage on a year earlier, T/T­12. 
(3) Measured on the basis of quarterly data. 
Source : Commission services. 
IICP 
1.4 
2.3 
1.5 
9.0 
4.7 
1.7 
2.4 
5.4 
1.9 
1.1 
2.0 
3.S 
1.0 
2.9 
3.1 
3.0 
1995<» 
CPI 
1.5 
2.1 
1.8 
9.3 
4.7 
1.8 
2.6 
5.2 
1.9 
1.9 
2.2 
4.1 
1.0 
2.5 
3.4 
3.1 
Difference 
I I C P - C P I 
-0.1 
0.2 
-0.3 
-0.3 
0.0 
-0.1 
-0.2 
0.2 
0.0 
-0.8 
-0 .2 
-0.3 
0.0 
0.4 
-0.3 
-0.1 
IICP 
1.7 
2.3 
1.4 
8.9 
3.4 
2.5 
2.1 
4.4 
1.3 
1.5 
1.8 
2.1 
1.1 
1.5 
3.0 
2.7 
March 1996<2> 
CPI 
2.0 
2.1 
1.7 
9.1 
3.4 
2.3 
2.0 
4.5 
1.2 
2.1 
1.8 
2.4 
0.6 
1.5 
2.7 
2.7 
Difference 
IICP - CPI 
-0.3 
0.2 
-0 .3 
-0 .2 
0.0 
0.2 
0.1 
-0.1 
0.1 
-0.6 
0.0 
-0.3 
0.5 
0.0 
0.3 
0.0 
IICP 
2.1 
2.5 
1.3 
8.1 
3.6 
1.6 
2.2 
3.5 
1.5 
1.4 
2.2 
3.2 
1.2 
0.6 
2.9 
2.4 
September 1996<2> 
CPI 
1.9 
2.3 
1.4 
8.5 
3.6 
1.6 
1.4 
3.4 
1.4 
2.0 
2.0 
3.4 
0.6 
­0.1 
2.1 
2.3 
Difference 
I I C P - C P I 
0.2 
0.2 
-0.1 
-0.4 
0.0 
0.0 
0.8 
0.1 
0.1 
-0.6 
0.2 
-0.2 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.1 
TABLE 3.6 
Three 
best 
performers : 
Reference va 
Number: 
Out of: 
: Inflat ion convergence using IICPs and CPIs 
(percentage change) 
Β 
D 
F 
NL 
L 
FIN 
S 
ue(2l 
B 
l)K 
I) 
F 
IRL3 
L 
NL 
A 
FIN 
S 
Interim indices 
of consumer prices " ' 
Dec. 
1995 (1) 
1.4 
­
­
1.1 
­
1.0 
­
2.7 
Sep. 
1996 " > 
­
1.3 
­
1.2 
­
0.9 
­
2.6 
Consumer 
Price Index t " 
Dec. Sep. 
1 9 9 5 " ) ■ 1 9 9 6 " ' 
1.5 
­
1.8 
­
­
1.0 
­
2.9 
­
­
­
­
1.3 
0.5 
1.2 
2.5 
Member States respecting the reference value 
9 
15 
1.4 
2.3 
1.5 
1.7 
2.4 
1.9 
1.1 
2.0 
1.0 
­
10 
15 
1.6 
2.2 
1.3 
2.1 
2.1 
1.3 
1.2 
1.7 
0.9 
1.6 
10 
15 
1.5 
2.1 
1.8 
1.8 
2.6 
1.9 
1.9 
2.2 
1.0 
2.5 
10 
15 
1.8 
2.0 
1.6 
2.1 
1.8 
1.3 
1.9 
1.8 
0.5 
1.2 
( 1 ) Measured by the percentage change in the arithmetic average of twelve monthly indices 
relative to arithmetic average of the twelve monthly indices of the previous period. 
(2) Definition adapted in this repon: arithmetic average of the three best performers in terms 
of inflation plus 1.5 percentage points. 
(3) Measured on the basis of quarterly data. 
Source: Commission services. 
Furthermore, since the inflation criterion is defined in relative and 
not in absolute terms, the use of the IICPs does not significantly 
influence the results. As indicated in Table 3.6, the number of 
countries respecting the reference value does not differ if the CPI 
is used instead of the IICP. However, the group of the three best 
performing countries is different. 
4. GOVERNMENT BUDGETARY POSITION 
4.1. Existence of an excessive deficit 
Fulfilment of the criterion on the sustainability of the government 
financial position depends, as the second indent of Ar­
ticle 109j(l) makes clear, on a Member State having achieved a 
government budgetary position without a deficit that is excessive 
as determined in accordance with Article 104c(6). Protocol No 6 
on the convergence criteria further states, in Article 2, that: 
"The criterion on the government budgetary position referred to 
in the second indent of Article 109j(l) of this Treaty shall mean 
that at the time of the examination the Member State is not the 
subject of a Council decision under Article 104c(6) of this Treaty 
that an excessive deficit exists ". 
The role of this report, therefore, is not to make an independent 
assessment of whether or not Member States currently fulfil the 
criterion on the government budgetary position. This is already 
determined by the Council decisions on the existence of an exces­
sive deficit. The first section of this chapter describes the applica­
tion of the excessive deficit procedure during the second stage of 
EMU and the decisions on the existence of an excessive deficit 
which are currently in force. In the remaining sections of this 
chapter recent budgetary developments in the Member States are 
reviewed. 
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The provisions of the excessive deficit procedure (Article 104c 
with the exception of paragraphs 1,9, 11 and 14, together with the 
associated Protocol (No 5)) have applied since the beginning of 
the second stage ofEMU in January 1994. The practice since then 
has been for the Commission and Council to implement the pro­
cedure on an annual basis. Each year the various steps of the pro­
cedure have been applied following the March reporting of bud­
getary data by Member States (as required by Council Regulation 
(EC) No 3605/93). The box on the "Excessive deficit procedure" 
describes the main features of the procedure during the second 
stage. 
In the first application of the procedure in 1994 the Council de­
cided1 in accordance with Article 104c(6) on the existence of an 
excessive deficit in ten of the then twelve Member States. Only 
Ireland and Luxembourg were not the subject of such a decision: 
in Ireland the government deficit was below the reference value 
of 3% of GDP and the government debt ratio, while above the ref­
erence value of 60% of GDP, had been declining significantly; in 
Luxembourg the government balance was in surplus and the debt 
ratio was far below the reference value. All the other ten Member 
States were judged not to satisfy one or both of the criteria for 
government deficit and debt. 
In 1995 the procedure was applied for the first time to the three 
new Member States (Austria, Finland and Sweden) and the Coun­
cil decided2 that an excessive deficit existed in each of them. At 
the same time the Council decided3 in accordance with with Ar­
ticle 104c(12) to abrogate the decision on Germany: the govern­
ment deficit in Germany had fallen below the reference value in 
1994 and was expected then to remain below in 1995, and the gov­
ernment debt ratio remained below the reference value. 
In the application of the procedure in 1996 the Council adopted a 
new decision4 on the existence of an excessive deficit in Germa­
ny: as it had turned out, the government deficit in Germany rose 
above the reference value in 1995 and was expected to remain 
above in 1996. The Council also decided5 to abrogate the deci­
sion on Denmark: the government deficit in Denmark fell well 
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Source: Commission services. 
below the reference value in 1995 and was expected to remain at a 
low level in 1996, and the government debt ratio, while still above 
the reference value, declined significantly in 1994 and 1995. 
Thus twelve Member States are currently the subject of a Council 
decision that an excessive deficit exists. At present, only three 
Member States (Denmark, Ireland and Luxembourg) are not the 
subject of such a decision and so fulfil the criterion on the govern­
ment budgetary position. 
4.2. Budgetary developments in 1996 
Efforts at budgetary consolidation in 1996 have been made within 
the context of a pause in economic growth. The Commission ser­
vices forecast real GDP growth of 1.6% this year for the European 
Union as a whole, and growth rates below this average are ex­
pected for Belgium, Germany, France, Italy and Austria. Despite 
the unfavourable economic climate almost all Member States are 
expected to make further progress in reducing government defi­
cits in 1996. According to the latest forecasts of the Commission 
services (see Table 4.1 and Graph 4.1), only Germany is likely to 
see a widening of its deficit in 1996. In all the other Member 
States and in the European Union as a whole the deficit is ex­
pected to decline (in Luxembourg, the surplus is likely to be 
smaller). Particularly large reductions in the deficit of more than 
1% of GDP are likely in Greece, Spain, the Netherlands, Austria, 
Portugal, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
On present estimates, it seems likely that in 1996 one more Mem­
ber State (the Netherlands) will succeed in reducing its deficit to 
below the 3% of GDP reference value, thus joining the three 
Member States which have already achieved this ­ Denmark, Ire­
land and Luxembourg (in surplus). Two Member States (Belgium 
and Finland) are likely to achieve a deficit of between 3% and 
3V2% of GDP this year and a further six (Germany, Spain. France. 
Austria, Portugal ana Sweden) are expected to have a deficit be­
low AVz% of GDP. 
T A B L E 4.1 : 
Β 
DK 
D 
EL 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 2 
NL 
A 
Ρ 
FIN 
S 
UK 
EUR 
(D 
(2) 
Sonn 
Autumn 
Negativt 
e: Comn 
General government 
(%ofGDP) 
1996 economie 
sign indicates 
lission services 
1993 
7.5 
3.9 
3.5 
14.2 
6.8 
5.6 
2.4 
9.6 
­1.7 
3.2 
4.2 
0.9 
S.I) 
12.3 
7.S 
6.2 
forecasts, 
ι surplus 
deficit 
1994 
5.1 
3.5 
2.4 
12.1 
6.3 
5.6 
1.7 
9.0 
­2.6 
3.4 
4.4 
5.S 
6.2 
10.8 
6.8 
5.4 
1995 
4.1 
1.6 
3.5 
9.1 
6.(i 
4.8 
2.0 
7.1 
­1.5 
4.0 
5.9 
5.1 
5.2 
8.1 
5.S 
5.0 
1996"» 
3.3 
1.4 
4.0 
7.9 
4.4 
4.0 
1.6 
6.6 
­0.9 
2.6 
4.3 
4.0 
3.3 
3.9 
4.6 
4.4 
1 Council decisions of 26 September 1994. None of the documents for the application of the 
procedure has been published in the Officiai Journal. 
2 Council decisions of 10 July 1995. 
3 Council decision of 10 July 1995. 
4 Council decision of 27 June 1996. 
5 Council decision of 27 June 1996. 
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1993 
137.0 
SII. 1 
48.2 
111.8 
60.5 
45.6 
94.5 
119.3 
6.2 
SUS 
62.8 
68.2 
57.3 
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135.0 
76.0 
50.4 
110.4 
63.1 
48.4 
87.9 
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5.7 
77.4 
65.1 
69.6 
59.5 
79.3 
50.4 
68.1 
1995 
133.7 
71.9 
58.1 
111.8 
65.7 
52.8 
81.6 
124.9 
6.0 
79.7 
69.0 
71.7 
59.2 
78.7 
54.1 
71.3 
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70.2 
60.8 
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67.8 
56.4 
74.7 
123.4 
7.S 
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71.7 
71.1 
61.3 
7S.1 
56.3 
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94/93 
­2.0 
^1.1 
2.2 
­1.4 
2.6 
2.8 
­6.6 
0.2 
­0.5 
­3.4 
2.3 
1.4 
2.2 
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­4.1 
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1.4 
2.6 
4.4 
­6.3 
­0.6 
0.3 
2.3 
3.9 
2.1 
­0.3 
­0.6 
3.7 
3.2 
96/95 
­3.1 
­1.7 
2.7 
­1.2 
2.1 
3.6 
­6.9 
­1.5 
1.8 
­1.0 
2.7 
­0.6 
2.1 
­0.6 
2.2 
2.2 
(1) Autumn 1996 economic forecasts. 
(2) Government deposits with the central bank, government holdings of non­governmental 
bonds and pablic enterprises related debt amounted to some 18 percent of GDP in 1995. 
(3)The sharp increase in the German debt ratio in 1995 is mainly caused by the take­over 
by the government of off­budget unification­related liabilities, the most important of 
which is the debt of the "Treuhan danstalt". 
Source: Commission services. 
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Persisting government deficits and relatively low growth of nom­
inal GDP (due to both poor real growth and a good or improving 
inflation performance) imply that the government gross debt ra­
tio, all other things being equal, is likely to continue rising in sev­
eral Member States in 1996 and in the European Union as a whole 
(see Table 4.2 and Graph 4.2). However, in Belgium, Denmark, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden the 
debt ratio ís expected to decline this year. 
At the end of 1996 the debt ratio is expected by the Commission 
services to be below the 60% of GDP reference value in three 
Member States ­ France, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom. 
The debt ratio is likely to rise to just above the 60% level in Ger­
many and Finland and to be in the range between 60 and 70% of 
GDP also in Spain. In Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Aus­
tria, Portugal and Sweden the debt ratio is likely to be in the range 
between 70 and 80% of GDP. Finally, in three Member States 
(Belgium, Greece and Italy) the debt ratio will remain higher than 
110% of GDP. 
4.3. Progress with budgetary consolidation dur­
ing the second stage of EMU 
At the beginning of the second stage of EMU budgetary positions 
in most Member States were in very serious imbalance; deficits 
had risen in many cases to record levels in 1993 as a result of the 
sharp recession and debt ratios were on an upward trend in all 
Member States except Ireland and Luxembourg. 
During the last three years efforts by Member State governments 
at budgetary consolidation have been intensified on a broad front. 
There has been a rising awareness of the risks for inflation, inter­
est rates and economic growth from uncorrected budgetary im­
balances generating debt trends which are very difficult to re­
verse. During this period financial markets have tended more 
clearly to attach a risk premium to countries with untackled bud­
getary problems. In addition, policy in the Member States has 
drawn support from the need for a high degree of convergence in 
view of the single currency. 
All the Member States with high levels of deficits have adopted 
ambitious medium­term programmes for budgetary consolida­
tion. Reducing budgetary imbalances is at the core of the conver­
gence programmes presented by Member States at Community 
level. 
Although in several cases progress has not been as rapid as origi­
nally planned and there have been a few setbacks, the experience 
since 1993 in most Member States has been one of steady narrow­
ing of government deficits (see Table 4.1 and Graph 4.3). The 
only exceptions are Germany, where after the deficit declined in 
1994 it has risen again in both 1995 and 1996, Spain, where the 
deficit increased in 1995 before declining again in 1996, the Neth­
erlands, where the deficit widened in 1994 and 1995 before 
declining in 1996, and Austria, which also saw its deficit continue 
to rise in 1994 and 1995 before a reduction in 1996. The surplus in 
Luxembourg has fluctuated from year to year. 
Especially large deficit reductions of over 4% of GDP have been 
achieved between 1993 and 1996 in Belgium, Greece, Finland 
and Sweden, while reductions of between 2% and 4% of GDP 
have been seen in Denmark, Spain, Italy, Portugal and the United 
Kingdom. Nonetheless many of these countries started from very 
high deficits and have not yet reached satisfactory deficit levels. 
Although the short­term focus is on bringing deficits down to 3% 
of GDP, this has to be seen as only a step on the way towards re­
establishing sound budgetary positions. As shown by the recent 
discussions about a stability pact on which proposals were 
adopted by the Commission on 16 October 1996, the 3% of GDP 
deficit reference value is to be considered not as a target but as a 
ceiling; it would be appropriate for Member States to aim in the 
medium term for budgetary positions close to balance or in sur­
plus so as to foster growth and employment. 
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4.3.1 Influence of the economic cycle 
Just as deficits in 1993 were swollen by the impact of recession, so 
part of the improvement in deficits since then can be ascribed to 
the effects on spending and tax revenues of the recovery in eco­
nomic activity. In 1994 and 1995 more than half of the deficit re­
duction in the EU as a whole can be ascribed to these cyclical in­
fluences, according to the prudent cyclical adjustment method 
used by the Commission services (see Table 4.3 and Graph 4.4). 
Between mid­1995 and mid­1996 there was a pause in growth 
which has generally depressed GDP growth rates for 1996 and in 
several countries has had an adverse impact on budget balances. 
According to latest estimates, while for the EU as a whole a reduc­
tion of 0.6% of GDP in the government deficit is expected in 
1996, cyclical influences have had a negative impact on this fig­
ure of 0.2% of GDP, and the decline in the cyclically adjusted def­
icit is estimated at 0.8% of GDP. 
Because of the recession in the early 1990s and the hesitant recov­
ery since then, levels of GDP in 1996 still remain below their 
trend in all Member States except Ireland. Such a negative output 
gap implies that the deficit adjusted for cyclical influences is not 
as high as the recorded deficit. Using the cyclical adjustment 
method of the Commission services, three Member States 
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(Belgium, Finland and Sweden) which are likely to record defi­
cits over 3% of GDP this year are estimated to have cyclically ad­
justed deficits equal to or below 3% of GDP (see Table 4.4).6 
4.3.2 Trends in the debt ratio 
Although there has been widespread progress in reducing budget 
deficits, this has only been sufficient in a few cases to clearly re­
verse the upward trend in the debt ratio (see Table 4.2 and Graph 
4.3). In Belgium the debt ratio has fallen each year from the very 
high level of 137.0% of GDP reached in 1993 and is expected to 
decline to 130.6% in 1996. In Denmark, similarly, the ratio 
peaked at 80.1% of GDP in 1993 and is likely to be at 70.2% in 
1996. The earlier decline in the debt ratio in Ireland has continued 
since 1993, from 94.5% of GDP in that year to an estimated 74.7% 
in 1996. 
In Greece the debt ratio expected in 1996 at 110.6% of GDP is be­
low its level in 1993. In the Netherlands the debt ratio in 1996 is 
also expected to be below its level of 1993. 
Elsewhere debt ratios have risen significantly over the last three 
years; by at least 5% of GDP in Germany, Spain, France, Austria 
and the United Kingdom. In Italy, after a sharp rise in 1994 the 
debt ratio fell marginally in 1995 and is expected to do so again in 
1996. A decline in the debt ratio is also expected in Portugal in 
1996. In Finland, after a small decline in 1995, the debt ratio is 
likely to rise again this year. In Sweden the debt ratio will have 
fallen in both 1995 and 1996 but remains above the level in 1993. 
The change in the absolute level of the government gross debt is. 
according to Treaty definitions, affected not only by the borrow­
ing to finance the government deficit each year, but also by a vari­
ety of other factors which are reflected in the liabilities in the gov­
ernment balance sheet. Thus, the value in national currency of 
debt denominated in foreign currency may change because of ex 
This method is, however, rather prudent: according to figures from the IMF pub­
lished in lhe World Economic Outlook of October 1996 for instance, of the Mem­
ber Stales with deficits over 3% of GDP this year, the structural deficit was esti­
mated to be below or equal to 3% in Belgium. Germany, Spain. France, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. 
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1994 
-2.3 
-0 .4 
-1.0 
-2.1 
-0.4 
0.0 
-0.7 
-0.5 
-1.0 
0.2 
11.2 
-1.1 
-1.8 
-1.5 
-1.0 
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Changes from previous year in the actual and cycli­
cally adjusted general government deficit (% of GDP) 
Change in deficit 
1995 1996 
-1.0 
-1.8 
1.1 
-3.0 
0.3 
-0.8 
0.3 
-1.9 
1.1 
0.7 
1.5 
-0.7 
-1.0 
-2.7 
-1.0 
-0.4 
-0.8 
-0.2 
0.5 
-1.2 
-2.2 
-0.8 
-0.4 
-0.5 
0.6 
-1.4 
-1.6 
-1.1 
-1.9 
-4.1 
-1.1 
-0.6 
Change in 
cyclically-adjusted deficit 
1994 
-2.0 
1.1 
-0.8 
-2.2 
-0.6 
0.5 
0.1 
-0.2 
n.a. 
0.7 
0.7 
-1.7 
0.1 
-0 .4 
-0.1 
-0.2 
1995 
-1.0 
-1.3 
0.9 
-2.9 
0.6 
-0.6 
2.8 
-1.2 
1.5 
0.4 
1.2 
-0.7 
1.0 
-1.3 
-0.7 
-0.2 
1996 
-1.0 
-0.3 
0.0 
-0.9 
-2.3 
-1.2 
0.4 
-0.9 
0.3 
-1.4 
-2.0 
-1.0 
-1.7 
-3.8 
-1.1 
-0.8 
A negative (positive) sign indicates a reduction (increase) in the respective deficits; * Luxem­
bourg has a surplus, thus a negative (positive) sign indicates a reduction (on increase) in its 
surplus. 
Source: Commission services; figures for 1996 from Autumn 1996 economic forecasts. 
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0.2 
0.5 
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0.8 
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0.9 
0.6 
0.5 
deficit in 1996 
Cyclically 
adjusted 
deficit 
2.7 
1.2 
3.5 
7.5 
3.5 
3.4 
3.6 
6.2 
-1 .3 
2.3 
4.1 
3.2 
2.2 
3.0 
4.0 
3.9 
Source: Commission services. Autumn 1996 economic forecasts. 
change rate movements; liabilities may be added to in order to fi­
nance on-lending to other sectors of the economy; the proceeds of 
privatisation sales or the running down of stocks of financial as­
sets may be used to reduce the level of gross debt, etc. In most 
Member States these factors taken together have in the past ten­
ded to add regularly to the level of the debt stock. Indeed, in the 
period 1989-93, they added more than 2 percentage points of 
GDP per year on average to the level of the debt stock in eight 
Member States and had an appreciable upward effect in all but the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom (see Table 4.5). On average 
in the three years 1994-96 the annual impact on the debt stock has 
been reduced compared with the previous period in almost all 
Member States, with the notable exception of Germany where 
there have been large unification-related debt assumptions. In­
deed the average annual effect has been negative (i.e. reducing the 
debt stock) in seven Member States in this recent period and has 
only exceeded a positive effect of 1 % of GDP per year in four 
Member States. There are a number of explanations for this 
change, including reduced exchange rate turbulence after 1993 
and less need for the emergency financing of banking and other 
sectors which had occurred in several countries. However, there is 
also evidence that, since the gross debt ratio has become more 
closely monitored during the second stage, governments have 
been managing their balance sheets more carefully. 
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Factors , o ther than the deficit , adding to the debt 
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1989-93 
annual average 
1.0 
3.7 
2.1 
S.I 
2.8 
0.9 
1.7 
1.8 
2.5 
0.1 
1.4 
3.4 
7.6 
5.1 
-0 .4 
0.9 
1994-96 
annual average 
-1.4 
-2.0 
2.9 
1.7 
0.6 
0.5 
-0.3 
1.3 
2.6 
-0.7 
0.8 
0.6 
-0.5 
-2.9 
-0.6 
0.6 
Source: Commission services. 
4.3.3 The sources of budgetary adjustment 
For the European Union as a whole the reduction in the govern­
ment deficit of 1.8% of GDP between 1993 and 1996 has been 
achieved through a reduction in the share in GDP of non-interest 
government expenditure. Between these two years the shares of 
current revenues and of interest payments have remained almost 
unchanged (see Table 4.6). 
The pattern at the level of individual Member States is more var­
ied. Most Member States have benefited from lower interest rates. 
Those Member States with steadily declining debt ratios have en­
joyed a marked decline in their interest payments (Belgium, Den­
mark, Ireland) and some others have benefited from declining 
nominal interest rates to an extent that has also cut their interest 
payments (Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal), In most 
of the remaining Member States the rising debt ratio has out­
weighed any favourable impact from lower nominal interest rates 
and the share of interest payments has risen - particularly sharply 
in Finland and Sweden. 
Non-interest government expenditure has been reduced as a 
share of GDP between 1993 and 1996 in all Member States except 
Portugal. Especially large declines of more than 4% of GDP have 
been achieved in Spain, the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden. 
Several of the Member States have increased taxation to achieve 
part of their budgetary adjustment. The share in GDP of current 
government revenues has risen between 1993 and 1996 in Bel­
gium, Denmark, Greece, France, Portugal, Finland, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom. Elsewhere this share has declined;there 
have been particularly sharp declines in this revenue ratio in Ire­
land, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 
In most Member States, however, the major part of budgetary ad­
justment has come from a reduction in the total expenditure ratio. 
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Β 
DK 
D 
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E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
A 
Ρ 
FIN 
S 
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EUR 
Revenue and expenditure shares, 1993 and 1996 (% of GDP) 
Curren 
1993 
49.2 
58.3 
46.4 
34.4 
42.8 
49.5 
37.8 
47.4 
44.7 
52.9 
49.4 
37.7 
53.8 
60.3 
35.9 
46.2 
(1) Autumn 1996 economic forecasts. 
Source Commission services. 
revenues 
1996(D 
50.5 
58.8 
45.7 
38.0 
40.3 
50.6 
34.7 
46.3 
41.7 
48.3 
48.2 
41.5 
55.3 
63.0 
37.7 
46.2 
Change 
96/93 
+ 1.3 
+0.5 
-0.7 
+3.6 
-2.5 
+ 1.1 
-3.1 
-1.1 
-3.0 
-4.6 
-1.2 
+3.8 
+ 1.5 
+2.7 
+ 1.8 
+0.0 
Non-
1993 
45.9 
54.5 
46.6 
35.7 
44.4 
51.7 
33.8 
44.9 
42.5 
49.9 
49.4 
38.1 
57.2 
66.4 
40.8 
47.1 
-interest expenditure 
1996<D 
45.3 
53.8 
45.9 
34.1 
39.4 
50.9 
31.8 
42.4 
40.4 
45.3 
48.0 
41.0 
52.8 
59.4 
38.6 
45.2 
Change 
96/93 
-0.6 
-0.7 
-0.7 
-1.6 
-5.0 
-0.8 
-2.0 
-2.5 
-2.1 
-4.6 
1.4 
+2.9 
-ΆΑ 
-7 .0 
-2.2 
-1.9 
Interest 
1993 
10.8 
7.8 
3.3 
12.8 
5.2 
3.4 
6.5 
12.1 
0.4 
6.2 
4.3 
6.8 
4.6 
6.2 
2.9 
5.4 
payments 
1996(11 
8.5 
6.4 
3.8 
11.9 
5.4 
3.8 
4.5 
10.5 
0.3 
5.6 
4,5 
4.9 
5.9 
7.5 
3.8 
5.4 
Change 
96/93 
-2.3 
-1 .4 
+0.5 
-0.9 
+0.2 
+0.4 
-2.0 
-1.6 
-0.1 
-0.6 
+0.2 
-1.9 
+1.3 
+ 1.3 
+0.9 
+0.0 
Some Member States have used part or almost all of the reduction 
in expenditure to finance lower taxation. By contrast, other Mem­
ber States have supplemented their expenditure-cutting efforts 
by also raising taxation. The reduction in the deficit between 1993 
and 1996 achieved through higher revenues has been at least as 
important as the reduction due to a lower total expenditure ratio in 
Greece, France and the United Kingdom. Portugal stands out 
from the other Member States during this period, in that it has 
used a sharp rise in tax revenues, albeit starting from a relatively 
low level, to finance both a rise in the expenditure ratio and deficit 
reduction. 
4.3.4 Deficits and fixed investment 
T A B L E 4.7: G o v e r n m e n t inves tment and deficit (% of G D P ) 
Β 
DK 
D 
EL 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L·2 NL 
A 
Ρ 
FIN 
S 
UK 
EUR 
Government 
fixed investment 
1995 
1.3 
2.0 
2.5 
2.9 
3.6 
3.0 
2.3 
2.3 
4.6 
2.7 
3.1 
4.0 
2.7 
3.3 
1.8 
2.6 
(1) Autumn 1996 economic forecasts. 
(2) Negative figure indicates a surplus. 
(3) Excluding Italy 
Source: Commission services. 
1996 
1.2 
2.0 
2.3 
2.6 
5.2 
3.1 
2.3 
n.a. 
4.8 
2.7 
3.1 
■1.5 
2.7 
3.2 
1.5 
2.5 <3> 
Government deficit 
1995 
4.1 
1.6 
3.5 
9.1 
6.6 
4.8 
2.0 
7.1 
­1.5 
4.0 
5.6 
5.1 
5.2 
8.1 
5.8 
5.0 
1996 d) 
3.3 
1.4 
4.0 
7.9 
4.4 
4.0 
1.6 
6.6 
­0.9 
2.6 
4.3 
4.0 
3.3 
3.9 
4.6 
4.4 
In its monitoring of budgetary developments for the excessive 
deficit procedure the Commission, as well as examining com­
pliance with the government deficit and debt criteria, has also to 
take into account whether the government deficit exceeds gov­
ernment investment expenditure. Table 4.7 shows figures for 
gross fixed capital formation by general government in 1995 and 
latest estimates for 1996 in each of the Member States and 
compares these with the corresponding government deficits. 
In those Member States where the government deficit remains 
above the 3% of GDP reference value, the deficit is larger than 
government expenditure on fixed investment (with the exception 
of Portugal in 1996). Apart from the Member States already with 
low deficits (Denmark, Ireland and Luxembourg), current gov­
ernment expenditure elsewhere is in part being financed through 
borrowing (i.e. government saving in most Member States is neg­
ative). 
4.4. Sustainability of budgetary convergence 
Budgetary consolidation efforts have been strengthened during 
the course of 1996. Most Member States, including all of those 
with deficits currently still above the 3% of GDP reference value, 
are aiming for a further reduction in their deficits in 1997. Budget 
plans presented so far during the autumn of 1996 have made clear­
er how governments intend to achieve this.Table 4.8 shows the 
objectives for the general government deficit in 1997 announced 
by Member State governments in their latest convergence pro­
grammes or in more recent budget statements. 
Several Member States expect to be clearly below the 3% level in 
1997. Another group is aiming at a deficit next year in line with 
the reference value. Only Greece is targeting a deficit in 1997 
higher than 3% of GDP; in its revised convergence programme 
Greece set the objective of bringing the deficit below the refer­
ence value in 1998. 
Beyond 1997 many Member States are already aiming for further 
reductions in their budget deficits, often with balance or surplus 
as a medium­term goal. Achieving sound and sustainable budget­
ary positions, leading to declining debt ratios where they are too 
high, is an essential condition for maintaining stability, keeping 
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Box 4: Excessive deficit procedure 
The excessive deficit procedure set out in Article 104c of the 
Treaty and the associated Protocol No 5 determines the steps to 
be followed to reach a decision by the Council that an exces­
sive deficit exists. 
The Commission is required (in paragraph 2 of Article 104c) to 
monitor the development of the budgetary situation and of the 
stock of government debt in the Member States with a view to 
identifying gross errors. In particular, compliance with bud­
getary discipline is to be examined by the Commission on the 
basis of the following two criteria: 
"(a) whether the ratio of the planned or actual government 
deficit to gross domestic product exceeds a reference value 
(specified in the Protocol as 3%), unless: 
- either the ratio has declined substantially and con­
tinuously and reached a level that comes close to the 
reference value; 
— or, alternatively, the excess of the reference value is 
only exceptional and temporary and the ratio re­
mains close to the reference value; 
(b) whether the ratio of government debt to gross domestic 
product exceeds a reference value (specified in the Protocol as 
60%), unless the ratio is sufficiently diminishing and ap­
proaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace. " 
The Commission is required to prepare a report if a Member 
State does not fulfil the requirements under one or both of these 
criteria. The report shall also take into account whether the 
government deficit exceeds government investment expendi­
ture and all other relevant factors, including the medium-term 
economic and budgetary position of the Member State 
(paragraph 3). 
Subsequent steps in the procedure include the formulation by 
the Monetary Committee of an opinion on the report of the 
Commission (paragraph 4); the addressing of an opinion to the 
Council by the Commission, if it considers that an excessive 
deficit exists (paragraph 5); and then a decision by the Council 
after an overall assessment whether an excessive deficit exists 
(paragraph 6). Finally, the Council makes non-public recom­
mendations to the Member State for which the existence of an 
excessive deficit has been decided with a view to bringing that 
situation to an end within a given period (paragraph 7). The 
Council may subsequently make its recommendations public, 
where it establishes that there has been no effective action in 
response to its recommendations within the period laid down 
(paragraph 8). When, in the view of the Council, the excessive 
deficit in the Member States concerned has been corrected, the 
Council abrogates its decision (paragraph 12). The provisions 
of Article 104c in paragraphs 9 and 11 are not applicable dur­
ing the second stage of EMU 
TABLE 4.8: 
Β 
DK 
D 
EL 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
A 
Ρ 
FIN 
S 
UK1 
11) Financial yea 
Objectives for the general government 
in 1997 (% of GDP) 
r 1997/98. 
2.9 
0.6 
2.5 
4.2 
3.0 
3.0 
<3 
3.0 
n.a. 
2.2 
3.0 
2.9 
1.4 
2.6 
3 
Source : National convergence programmes or more recen 
deficit 
budget statements. 
interest rates low and fostering the growth of output and employ­
ment. The Commission's proposals for a stability pact involve a 
firm implementation of Treaty provisions so as to ensure budget­
ary discipline in the third stage. 
5. EXCHANGE RATES 
5.1. Treaty provisions 
The exchange rate criterion, as set out in the third indent of Ar­
ticle 109j(l) of the Treaty, is defined as "the observance of the 
normal fluctuation margins provided for by the exchange-rate 
mechanism of the European Monetary System for at least two 
years, without devaluing against the currency of any other Mem­
ber State ". The fourth indent of the same Article refers to "the du­
rability of convergence achieved by the Member State and of its 
participation in the exchange-rate mechanism of the European 
Monetary System being reflected in the long-term interest-rate 
levels". In addition, Article 3 of the Protocol (No 6) on the con­
vergence criteria specifies that: "The criterion on participation in 
the exchange-rate mechanism of the European Monetary System 
referred to in the third indent of Article 109j(l) of this Treaty shall 
mean that a Member State has respected the normal fluctuation 
margins provided for by the exchange-rate mechanism of the Eu­
ropean Monetary System without severe tensions for at least the 
last two years before the examination. In particular, the Member-
State shall not have devalued its currency "s bilateral'central rate 
against any other Member State "s currency on its own initiative 
for the same period". 
Eleven currencies are currently participating in the ERM. The 
Austrian schilling joined the ERM at the beginning of 1995 and 
has continued to trade in its traditional, very narrow range against 
the DM. The Finnish markka joined the ERM on 14 Octo­
ber 1996. The drachma and the Swedish krona have remained 
outside the ERM, while the lira and sterling have not re-joined 
since leaving the mechanism in September 1992. 
In the first half of 1995, exchange rate tensions emerged at the in­
ternational level, reflecting mainly the financial crisis in Mexico 
and US-Japan trade tensions; these caused a pronounced weaken­
ing of the US dollar which, combined with country-specific prob­
lems in Europe, contributed to a strengthening of the DM against 
many of the ERM currencies and to the increase in the volatility of 
these currencies. As a result, tensions emerged within the ERM 
that led to a realignment on 6 March 1995: at the request of the 
Spanish authorities, the Ministers and Central Bank Governors 
decided the devaluation of the peseta by 7%; by the same deci­
sion, the escudo was devalued by 3.5%. 
GRAPH 5.1 : ERM grid spread 
(gap of the strongest against the weakest currency) 
% 
1994 
Source: Commission services. 
1995 1996 
Tensions in the ERM are reflected in the spread between the stron-
gest and the weakest currencies in the mechanism, as shown in 
Graph 5.1. The spread widened to about 12% in February 1995. 
As international financial markets stabilised the spread declined 
to just 4% in late Summer 1995. After a temporary increase in 
September, mainly caused by a weakness of the US dollar, the 
spread resumed its downward trend by the end of 1995. By 
June 1996 the spread had narrowed to below 2%. This rather 
promising performance continued until the autumn. In general, 
although temporary tensions occurred, the ERM has been charac-
terised by a high degree of stability during most of 1996. 
Within the ERM band (see Graph 5.2), the DM, the guilder, the 
schilling and the Belgian franc have been strong throughout the 
two-year period. In 1995, the peseta recovered sharply in the two 
months after its devaluation, and it has remained strong in 1996. 
By contrast, the Irish punt, affected by the course of the dollar and 
sterling, weakened considerably in the first quarter of 1995 and, 
though it strengthened thereafter, it remained below its central 
rate until May 1996, but it has since recovered strongly. The 
French franc traded in the lower part of the band for most of the 
two years, but more recently the French franc recovered closer to 
its central rate. The escudo and the Danish krone generally re-
mained close to their central rates. 
In sum, currently nine currencies have been members of the ERM 
for over two years: DKR, BFR, DM, PTA, FF, IRL, LFR, HFL 
and ESC. The Austrian schilling will have completed two years of 
membership by the end of 1996. With the exception of the PTA 
and the ESC, these currencies have not modified their central 
ERM parities over the past two years and, while large fluctuations 
have taken place in the band, none of these eight currencies can be 
said to have undergone severe tensions. The central rate of the pe-
seta was devalued, in March 1995, at the request of the Spanish 
authorities. The central rate of the Portuguese escudo was also ad-
justed downwards following the decision to change the central 
GRAPH 5.2: Movements within the ERM band 
(% deviation from ECU central rate) 
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rate of the Spanish currency1. Since the middle of October 1996 
the Finnish markka has also been a member of the ERM. 
5.2. Further analysis of exchange rate stability 
Similar indications are obtained if stability of exchange rates is 
considered in terms of the coefficient of variation2, which enables 
cross-currency comparisons. Graph 5.3 depicts variability 
against the DM. 
It can be seen that, after the turbulence of the first half of 1995, the 
variability of most currencies returned to previously prevailing 
evels. Also, ERM currencies varied by less than those outside: in 
the two-year period, on average, the five currencies outside the 
ERM are also the ones that displayed the greatest variability; 
1 EU Communiqué, 6 March 1995. 
2 Defined ahs the standard deviation divided by the mean. 
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among these, the Finnish markka has fluctuated the least and has­
been comparatively stable in 1995 and 1996. The lira and the 
Swedish krona were the most volatile. Inside the ERM, the guil­
der, the schilling and the Belgian franc have displayed minimal 
variability and the Danish krone joined that group from Novem­
ber 1995. The variability of the other ERM currencies has also 
tended to be lower in 1996 than in earlier years. 
Domestic causes of foreign exchange unrest include concern over 
the capacity of countries or the willingness of governments to 
achieve the high degree of convergence required for a single cur­
rency. In addition, the development of fundamentals, mainly pub­
lic finance and inflation but also unemployment, exerted direct 
influence on exchange rate developments. Some influence, most­
ly towards appreciation and stability, was exerted on the Finnish 
markka and the Italian lira, as a result of expectations for joining 
the ERM. 
In 1996, a number of factors contributed to the easing of tensions 
in foreign exchange markets. Firstly, the recovery of the US dollar 
played a most important role: from below 1.40 DM in late 1995, 
the dollar rose to about 1.54 DM in June 1996; the dollar pulled 
upwards mainly sterling and the punt and generally reinforced the 
weaker European currencies against the stronger group. This also 
had a considerable bearing on the functioning of the ERM by re­
ducing the spread between the weakest and the strongest curren­
cies. Subsequently, a temporary weakening of the dollar, which 
fell to 1.48 DM in July 1996, did not have a substantial effect on 
the ERM spread; renewed strength in the dollar in September and 
October 1996 was accompanied by a slight widening of the 
spread as the punt appreciated further and became the strongest 
currency in the ERM. 
Secondly, a more synchronised cycle in the European economies 
and prospects for disinflation in the higher inflation countries al­
lowed parallel monetary policy moves and reduced the scope for 
speculative behaviour. 
Finally, trading in relation to convergence prospects was a very 
important factor. From the second half of 1995, governments in­
creasingly took conspicuous measures to improve their conver­
gence situation. At the same time, the European authorities dem­
onstrated repeatedly their determination to proceed to 
MonetaryUnion; particularly after the Madrid European Council, 
where the realisation of EMU in 1999 became a certainty. These 
prospects contributed to the calming of exchange rates and to the 
substantial reduction of interest rate differentials. 
6. LONG­TERM INTEREST RATES 
6.1. Interest rate convergence 
The criterion addressed here, as defined by the fourth indent of 
Article 109j(l) of the Treaty, is "the durability of convergence 
achieved by the Member State and of its participation in the ex­
change rate mechanism of the European Monetary System being 
reflected in the long­term interest rate levels ". This criterion on 
the convergence of interest rates is developed further in the Proto­
col No 6 on the convergence criteria, Article 4 of which states that 
the criterion "shall mean that, observed over a period of one year 
before the examination, a Member State has had an average 
long­term interest rate that does not exceed by more than 2 per­
centage points that of, at most, the three best performing Member 
GRAPH 5.3. : Stability of exchange rate vis­à­vis the DM: 13­week moving coefficient of variation January 1994 ­ October 1996 
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States in terms of price stability ". It goes on to say that "In­
terest rates shall be measured on the basis of long­terni 
government bonds or comparable securities, taking into 
account differences in national definitions. " 
The unweighted arithmetic average of the 12­month average of 
the long­term interest rate of the three best performers in terms of 
inflation has been used in this report for the calculation of the ref­
erence value (see also analysis of Chapter 3). For most Member 
States, the yield on the ten­year benchmark bond is the one used 
in the calculations. Efforts have been made to make these data as 
comparable as possible. Further details on the interest rates used 
for each Member State are contained in the box on "Data and ref­
erence value for the interest rate convergence criterion". All ref­
erences to the long­term interest rate in this section refer to the 
average over the latest 12 months of the nominal long­term inter­
est rate. 
The three best performing Member States with respect to con­
sumer price inflation ' in September 1996 were: Germany, the 
Netherlands and Finland. The average nominal long­term inter­
est rates for these countries in September were, respectively: 
6.3%, 6.3% and 7.4%, producing a reference value of 8.7% (see 
Table 6.1). Two of these three countries also had the lowest­
average interest rates, namely, Germany and the Netherlands. 
TABLE 6.1. 
Β 
DK 
D 
F 
IRL 
L 
NL 
FIN 
UK 
: L o n g - t e r m interest rate convergence in the 
M e m b e r States 
Reference value -
Number: 
out of: 
Β 
DK 
D 
F 
IRL 
L 
NL 
A 
FIN 
S 
UK 
1993 
12­month average 
1994 
Three best price 
-
7.3 
-
-
7.7 
-
-
-
7.5 
9.5 
-
7.9 
-
7.2 
-
7.7 
-
-
-
9.6 
Member States respecting the 
8 
12 
7.2 
7.3 
6.5 
6.8 
7.7 
6.5 
6.3 
-
-
-
7.? 
8 
12 
7.9 
7.υ 
7.1 
7.2 
7.9 
7.7 
6.9 
-
-
-
S.2 
1995 
performers 
7.5 
-
-
-
-
-
6.9 
8.8 
-
9.7 
996 ( 1) 
-
-
6.3 
-
-
-
6.3 
7.4 
-
8.7 
reference value 
10 
15 
7.5 
S.3 
0.9 
7.5 
S.3 
7.6 
6.9 
7.1 
s.s 
-
S.3 
11 
15 
6.7 
7.4 
6.3 
6.6 
7.5 
7.0 
6.3 
6.5 
7.4 
8.5 
8.0 
(1) Oct. 1995 to Sep. 1996 
(2) Definition adopted in this report: arithmetic average ot'the 12­month aver­
age of interest rates of the three best Member States in terms of price stabil­
ity plus 2 percentage points. 
Source : EMI 
In all, eleven Member States had average interest rates below the 
reference value in September 1996. These were: Belgium, Den­
mark, Germany, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Austria, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Four Mem­
ber States (Greece, Spain, Italy, and Portugal) had average inter­
est rates above the reference value. Sweden's average interest rate 
was above the reference value at the end of 1995 but, having de­
clined during 1996, it moved below the reference value in August 
1996. 
T A B L E 6.2: Deve lopment of l o n g -
1993"> 
Β 7.2 
DK 7.3 
D 6.5 
EL 23.3 
E 10.2 
F 6.8 
IRL 7.7 
I 11.2 
L 6.5 
NL 6.3 
A 6.7 
Ρ 9.7 
FIN 8.8 
S 8.5 
UK 7.5 
Average of 3 best 
price performers 7.5 
Dispersion from 
average of 3 best 
term interest rates 
12­11 ion lb 
1994(1) 
7.9 
7.9 
7.1 
20.8 
10.0 
7.2 
7.9 
10.5 
7.7 
0.9 
7.0 
10.5 
9.1 
0.7 
8.2 
iverage 
I995"> 
7.5 
8.3 
6.9 
17.4 
11.3 
7.5 
8.3 
12.2 
7.6 
6.0 
7.1 
11.5 
X.X 
10.2 
8.3 
pro memoria 
7.6 
price performers ( 3 ) 1.6 1.5 
O) For 1993, data are non­comparable for Luxembourg (Januar) 
gal (January­June). For Greece data are non­comparable. 121 Average of October 1995 to September 1996. 
*3) Measured by the standard deviation around the average of tht 
(Greece omitted from calculations in all years: Luxembourg ( 
in :993). 
Source: EMI. 
7.7 
2.0 
1996(1)(2) 
6.7 
7.4 
6.3 
15.1 
9.5 
6.6 
7.5 
10.3 
7.0 
6.3 
6.5 
9.4 
7.4 
8.5 
8.0 
6.7 
1.6 
­September) and Portu­
3 best price performers 
mined from calculations 
This impression of an improvement in the convergence situation 
since the end of 1995 is confirmed when the underlying situation 
of individual Member States is considered (see Graph 6.1 and 
Table 6.2). During this period, the reference value gradually de­
clined, and the dispersion around this reference value diminished 
from 2.0 at the end of 1995 to 1.6 by September 1996 (see 
Table 6.2). Underlying this general trend are somewhat different 
developments in Member States satisfying the criterion and those 
not satisfying the criterion at the end of 1995. Although all coun­
tries experienced falling average rates, the pace of the fall was 
considerably less among those Member States in the former 
group than those in the latter group. Finland, with a fall in the av­
erage rate of 1.4 percentage points between the end of 1995 and 
September 1996, provided an exception to this latter observation. 
Indeed, the fall in Finnish rates accounts for the major part of the 
fall in the reference value, while the falls in the five Member 
States not respecting the reference value at the end of 1995 help to 
explain the reduction in dispersion. Compared with December 
1995, the interest rate convergence gap (the difference between 
the average domestic interest rate and the reference value) fell for 
Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal, respectively to 6.4 percentage 
points (­1.3), 1.6 percentage points (­0.9), 0.8 percentage points 
(­0.8), and 0.7 percentage points (­1.1). Greece remains the least 
convergent Member State, while Sweden moved from a diver­
gence of 0.5 percentage points at the end of 1995 to being 0.2 per­
centage points below the reference value in September 1996. 
Within the group of countries meeting the criterion, the picture 
was somewhat different. In general, the pace of the decline in av­
erage long­term rates over the review period was less than in the 
group of countries not satisfying the criterion. This was to be ex­
pected since long­term rates in these countries were already low 
(see Graph 6.1). Finland provides an exception to the general 
trend. The strong decline in Finnish long­term rates, together 
1 The price index used to establish the three best performers is the interim index of 
consumer prices (IICP) from December 1995 and the consumer price index (CPU 
before then (see Chapter 3). 
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GRAPH 6.1 : Recent evolution of long-term interest rates 
(12­month average of 10 year benchmark yields) 
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with the levelling off of rates in the United Kingdom, saw the lat­
ter replacing Finland as the Member State in this group with the 
highest long­term rates.2 The dispersion within the group itself 
declined. Excluding Sweden, the spread between the lowest inter­
est rate (Germany: 6.9%) and the highest interest rate (Finland: 
8.8%) was 1.9 percentage points at the end of 1995. This fell to 
1.7 percentage points (=8.0% for the United Kingdom less 6.3% 
for the Netherlands) in September 1996. Including Sweden, the 
spread in September 1996 was higher at 2.2 percentage points. 
GRAPH 6.2 : Long-term interest rate convergence 
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6.2. Recent developments in long­term interest 
rates* 
In this section, the recent evolution of long­term interest rates is 
analysed by a consideration of the paths followed by monthly 
nominal long­term interest rates (as opposed to the 12­month av­
erages of the previous section) in the Member States and at the 
level of the Union as a whole. The sharp upward movement in 
nominal long­term rates in the European Union in 1994, was fol­
lowed by a steady downward trend in 1995. After a brief interrup­
tion at the beginning of the year, this downward path has contin­
ued in 1996 (see Graph 6.3). Falling long­term interest rates in 
1995 were generally seen as an international phenomenon stem­
ming from a slowdown of growth in the USA, deflationary pres­
sures in Japan, and perceptions of lower inflationary pressures in 
Europe. 
Revisions in market expectations about the likelihood of official 
interest rates cuts in Germany and the US were widely cited as the 
reason for the upward spike in long­term interest rates at the 
beginning of 1996. Expectations that a policy of monetary easing 
in Germany had reached a turning point surfaced towards the end 
of January. This was compounded in February by expectations of 
a tightening of monetary policy in the USA, the effect of which 
spilled over from US to European bond markets. This internation­
al trend was driven partly by market fears of excess global liquid­
ity following the sustained reduction in interest rates in the major 
economies throughout 1995. 
The resumption of downward trend in average nominal long­
term rates in the EU since April 1996 may be explained by a num­
ber of factors. These include: a decoupling of trends in the USA 
and some European bond markets in the second quarter of 1996; 
and, in the third quarter, another shift in market expectations con­
cerning US and Japanese monetary policy, this time away from a 
near­term tightening, which resulted in internationally falling 
long­term rates. In September 1996, the average level of bond 
yields in the EU recorded a level of 7.2%, 1 percentage point low­
er than in September 1995 and below the level of 7.3% recorded 
in January 1996. 
A number of features in the evolution of long­term interest rates 
across Member States may be highlighted. First, although long­
term rates fell in all EU countries over the period between Sep­
tember 1995 and September 1996, the size of the fall varied 
across countries (see Table 6.3). In general, those countries with 
the highest long­term rates experienced the largest falls: Italy, 
Portugal, Spain and Sweden recorded reductions in the range of 
1.8­2.9 percentage points. 
In Greece the decline was less, so that long­term rates remain 
high3. Among the countries already with lower interest rates, Fin­
land, also benefiting from lower inflation expectations, recorded 
a substantial reduction (1.1 percentage points). Given that the 
largest interest rate reductions, over the year to September 1996, 
were realised by those Member States with the highest nominal 
long­term rates, interest rate differentials over corresponding 
German bonds narrowed4 during the year, with Spain, Italy, 
Portugal and Sweden experiencing the largest reductions. 
Second, while all EU countries shared common trends in nominal 
long­term rates between August 1995 and March 1996, there 
has been some divergence of experience among Member States 
Until Sweden became a member of this group in August 1996. 
It should be noted that the data for Greece are not comparable to the data for other 
Member States. In the absence of a long­term capital market a bond with an original 
maturity of 5 years is used. In addition, the existence of a reporting lag in the receipt 
of the data hampers up­to­date comparisons. 
For all countries except the United Kingdom. 
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GRAPH 6.3: Average of government bond yields in the EC 
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6.3. Explanatory factors and assessment 
since then. Following the brief upward blip in the first quarter, all 
countries except the United Kingdom recorded reductions once 
again during April. For Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Luxem­
bourg and Austria, long­term rates rose over the period May­
June, before dropping once again in July­August. On the other 
hand, the downward trend persisted in the high­yield countries, 
namely, Spain, Italy and Portugal. 
Progress was made over the last year in terms of interest rate con­
vergence, with Sweden satisfying this convergence criterion from 
August 1996 and the remaining four countries (Greece, Spain, 
Italy and Portugal) moving nearer the reference value. Spain, Ita­
ly and Portugal also recorded considerable narrowing of their 
interest rate convergence gaps. Indeed, if the current levels of in­
terest rates were to be maintained, the average long­term rates for 
Box 5: Data and reference value for the interest rate convergence criterion 
Data 
According to Article 4 of the Protocol on the convergence 
criteria: 
"Interest rates shall be measured on the basis of long­term gov­
ernment bonds or comparable securities, taking into account 
differences in national definitions. " 
According to Article 5 of the same Protocol, the Commission 
shall provide the statistical data for the application of the interest 
rate convergence criterion. In agreement with the European 
Monetary Institute, which has a comparative advantage in the 
analysis of financial statistics and has advised the Commission 
on the issue, interest rates with the following characteristics 
have been deemed the most appropriate for the examination of 
the interest rate criterion: 
­ maturity: residual maturity close to 10 years (9 to 10.5 
years) 
issuer: central government (in Germany including Treu­
handanstalt) 
choice of bonds: liquidity is the main selection criterion; 
the choice between a single benchmark or the average of 
a sample should be based on this requirement; most 
(eleven) Member States choose a benchmark (Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Nether­
lands, Austria, Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom), 
while three Member States choose an average (Germany, 
Spain, Portugal) 
­ aggregation: simple average should be used if there is 
more than one bond in the sample 
­ gross of tax 
­ yield calculation: ISMA­formula for yield to maturity 
­ coupon: fixed 
In Greece, in the absence of a long­term capital market a bond 
with an original maturity of 5 years was selected. Its coupon is 
indexed to the 12­month treasury bill and adjusted yearly. Con­
trary to the other Member States where daily quotations are 
available, an end­of­month figure is used. 
The present evaluation of the long­term interest rate criterion is 
based on harmonised long­term interest rates, incorporating the 
above characteristics. 
Reference value 
According to Article 4 of the Protocol on the convergence crite­
ria, the criterion on the convergence of interest rates "shall mean 
that, observed over a period of one year before this examination, 
a Member State has had an average nominal long term interest 
rate that does not exceed by more than 2 percentage points that 
of, at most, the three best performing Member States in terms of 
price stability. " 
The unweighted arithmetic average interest rate of the three best 
performers in terms of price stability is used in this examination 
of the interest rate criterion for the calculation of the reference 
value. 
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Spain and Portugal would very shortly come under the reference 
value. This favourable development may be attributed to a num­
ber of underlying factors. One important factor is the declining 
inflation rates in these countries, which in turn helped to reduce 
inflation expectations. This is particularly the case for Spain, Por­
tugal and Sweden, which recorded sizeable reductions in average 
inflation rates between December 1995 and September 1996. 
Compared to the previous year, the rapid reduction in inflation in 
Portugal appears to have affected long-term interest rates. 
Greece's less spectacular progress in terms of inflation, given the 
high starting point, may help explain the slower progress in terms 
of reducing the interest rate gap in this country. 
A second important explanatory factor was the efforts made in 
these countries in terms of reducing government deficits. Such 
progress in government deficit consolidation contributed to a 
more balanced policy mix and thus to reducing the credit risk pre­
mium. The progressive calming of exchange rate markets during 
the 1996 created conditions for a stabilising of bond markets. 
7. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 
This chapter reviews developments in several other areas which 
are required by Article 109j(l) to be taken account of by the Com­
mission (and the EMI) in their reports. The following sections ex­
amine the developments of the ECU, the results of the integration 
of markets, the situation and development of the balances of pay­
ments on current account and the development of unit labour 
costs and other price indices. 
7.1. Development of the ECU 
The ECU markets encountered difficult conditions in 1995 and 
much of 1996. Primary bond market activity contracted to histori­
cally low levels, though secondary market turnover proved to be 
more robust. A degree of stability was provided by sovereign is­
suers through the continuation of regular debt programmes in 
ECU but, with private issuers largely ignoring the ECU, liquidity 
in the market was much reduced. From the start of the second half 
of 1996 interest in the ECU began to recover as confidence in the 
EMU process developed and perceived uncertainties, like the 
start date of monetary union, the 1:1 substitution of the euro for 
the ECU and continuity of ECU contracts, began to crumble. With 
the release of the regulations on the legal framework for the euro 
positive market sentiment towards the ECU has firmed, and mar­
ket analysts now anticipate a return to growth in the ECU markets 
in the run up to 1 January 1999 and the start of monetary union. 
One manifestation of the ECU's difficulties was the emergence 
from the middle of 1994 of a persistent spread, in excess of 50 ba­
sis points, between the market exchange rate value of the ECU 
and its theoretical value. In an historical context, ±20 basis 
points had been considered to be the normal trading range of the 
spread; moreover, on those occasions when the spread exceeded 
its normal range, in particular during the ERM crises in 1992 and 
1993, it had done so for only a short period of time before arbi­
trage activity by the so-called "basket makers" brought the 
spread rapidly down to more normal levels. Towards the end of 
1994, the spread - though still volatile - had contracted, reaching 
around 20 basis points. However, with the subsequent re-emer­
gence of ERM tensions in early 1995 the spread rapidly increased 
reaching a high of 152 basis points by the end of March 1995. 
Though it subsequently fell to under 100 basis points this was 
only a temporary respite. The spread reached over 300 basis 
points at the end of 1995. During the first half of 1996 confidence 
began to return to the ECU markets and the spread tended to fluc­
tuate between 150 and 250 basis points, with a slow fall com­
mencing Γη May. During the second half of 1996 the spread stabi­
lised at approximately 100 basis points during July and August, 
and then fell to below 60 basis points by the end of September. 
Subsequently the spread has contracted further to between 30 to 
20 basis points. 
The underlying reasons, and their relative importance, for the be­
haviour of the spread are difficult to determine precisely, but a 
number of factors have demonstrably played a role. First, ex­
change rate tensions in the ERM have had a negative impact on 
the ECU. Second, there has been an increase in the perceived risk 
of running open positions in ECU, which has been reflected in the 
switch by the basket maker banks from a long-term strategy, in 
which they were willing to hold open positions in ECU for consid­
erable periods of time, to a short-term strategy in which profits 
are taken as soon as possible even though greater profits would 
potentially have been generated by holding the position for long­
er. 
In part also, the increase in perceived risk stems from a growing 
awareness that since 1987 there has been no institutionalised link 
between the market ECU and the basket apart from the conver­
sion of ECU into euro at 1:1 upon the start of Stage Three, on 
1 January 1999'. For many market operators the level of uncer­
tainty, over the EMU timetable and legal issues, was such that 
they took little comfort from the 1:1 provision in the Treaty. Thus 
uncertainty over EMU fed through to concerns over the future 
value of the ECU. However, since the European Council in Ma­
drid in December 1995, market confidence has been growing as 
the high level of political commitment to monetary union has 
been repeatedly demonstrated and the uncertainties over legal is­
sues, such as the continuity of contracts and the 1:1 conversion of 
ECU into euro, have largely been removed by the regulations pro­
posed by the Commission. 
The exchange rate value of the ECU may also have been damaged 
by the high level of net redemptions of ECU denominated bonds 
in 1995 and 1996. Given a contraction in the stock of outstanding 
ECU denominated bonds, the proceeds from repayments, funded 
by the drawing down of existing ECU deposits, have tended to be 
exchanged for other currencies for reinvestment. This has put 
downward pressure on the exchange rate value of the ECU; how­
ever, as confidence in EMU has grown so too confidence in the 
ECU markets has slowly been returning and the spread has re­
duced. 
During 1995, the amount of bond issues denominated in ECU was 
significantly lower than the amount of maturing paper with the re­
sult that the stock of outstanding debt in ECU declined by 6% to 
ECU 127 billion (excluding Greek ECU-linked bonds). This 
compares to a historic peak of ECU 140 billion stock outstanding 
in 1993. During the first nine months of 1996, demand for ECU 
from institutional investors remained subdued and private issuers 
were few in number and wary. Issue activity was therefore low, 
with periods of no issuing. The total amount issued during the first 
nine months of 1996 amounted to ECU 10.9 billion compared 
with ECU 13.5 billion over the same period in 1995. Thus with 
ECU 18.9 billion of maturing paper the stock of outstanding ECU 
denominated debt fell to ECU 119 billion by the end of Septem­
ber 1996. 
In the secondary market, average turnover in ECU bonds rose in 
value terms by 8% in 1995, its highest level since 1992. In the first 
nine months of 1996 there was a further rise of 4%. As a percent 
1 Until 1987 the institutionalised link was also provided qby the acceptance by the 
ECU Banking Association of delivery of the basket in the settlement of ECU posi­
tions in the clearing. 
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age of the total secondary market the share of the ECU declined 
from 5.6% in 1.993 to 5.2% in 1994 and 1995, but rose slightly to 
5.3% in 1996 (up to the end of September). 
In contrast to the steady contraction of the ECU bond markets oth-
er ECU markets have performed better but have nevertheless reg-
istered decreases in activity. The approximate measure of com-
mercial and financial activity provided by the daily average 
turnover in the EBA ECU Clearing System has experience a mod-
est fall in activity, from ECU 50.0 billion during 1994 to 
ECU 46.8 billion during 1995, a year on year decrease of 6.5%. 
For the first nine months the average daily turnover in 1996 is 
some 2.1% lower than for 1995 at ECU 45.8 billion. 
Studies of ECU flows related to commercial transactions (i.e. pur-
chase of goods and services) as opposed to purely financial trans-
actions suggest that commercial payments account for a small 
portion of total payments (1996 results: 7.1% in volume terms, 
0.7% value), but that nevertheless commercial ECU payments 
can be estimated to be in the region of ECU 50 billion to 
ECU 75 billion. 
7.2. Results of the integration of markets 
With an average of about 93% of Single Market legislation trans-
posed into domestic legislation by all Member States, the Single 
Market is becoming reality. It is not yet complete, but the achieve-
ment so far should not be underestimated. It has already made the 
European Union the most economically integrated collection of 
nation states in the world. Evidence of this deepening integration 
is accumulating. 
7.2.1 Market integration through trade 
By removing trade barriers between countries, the Single Market 
was expected to expand trade among EU Member States. In fact, 
between 1985 and 1995, the share of intra-EU imports in total 
manufacturing imports has indeed increased on average by 6.7 
percentage po;nts from 61.2% in 1985 to 67.9% in 1995. Further-
more, intra-EU penetration ratios increased much more in fifteen 
manufacturing industries identified ex ante as particularly sensi-
tive to the Single Market project (SMP) than in all other manufac-
turing sectors. For services during the same period 1985-1995, 
the share of intra-EU exports in total services exports has in-
creased on average by 3.1 percentage points from 46.9% in 1985 
to 50.0% in 1995. Direct and pro-competitive effects of the SMP 
on trade almost fully explain these changes in the market share of 
intra-EU imports. 
Increasing economic integration may lead to greater country spe-
cialisation on the basis of their respective comparative advan-
tages (inter-industry trade) or it may favour intra-industry trade, 
the simultaneous import and export of similar product lines be-
tween Member States. 
Inter-industry trade between different countries carries efficien-
cy gains, with each country specialising in those activities in 
which it is relatively more efficient, and consumers gaining lower 
prices as a consequence. However, this would imply a deeper spe-
cialisation between the less developed Member States and the 
more advanced, each country experiencing a contraction of some 
sectors and expansion of others, which may imply significant ad-
justment costs. 
By contrast, intra-industry trade benefits the consumer by lead-
ing to a much wider variety of products, whilst producers face 
lower adjustment costs. Here, adjustments would take place 
amongst firms inside industries rather than amongst industries. 
At the beginning of the 1980s, most trade within.the Community 
could be classified as inter-industry2 (around 45%). However, 
the preparation phase of the Single Market was accompanied by a 
decrease in the share of inter-industry trade in Europe and a rise in 
intra-industry trade - which itself could be further subdifferen-
tiated: either intra-industry trade in similar products in terms of 
prices and quality or intra-industry trade in products differen-
tiated by price and quality (for example, one country exporting 
brand-name expensive shirts and the other inexpensive low qual-
ity shirts). The rise in intra-industry trade has predominantly 
been the latter type (from less than 35% in 1985 to more than 42% 
in 1994), whilst intra-industry trade in similar products3 re-
mained rather stable (around 20% of total intra-EU trade). The 
SMP has therefore increased the range of products available to 
consumers in terms of prices and quality, and encouraged differ-
ing business strategies: either emphasising design, research and 
development, and advertising in some cases (high price-quality) 
or production cost-minimising in others (low price). 
In the period 1985-94, all EU countries have experienced a de-
crease in inter-industry trade, but especially Spain, the 
United Kingdom, France and Germany. Nevertheless, in 1994, 
inter-industry trade still accounted for over 58% of the total 
manufacturing trade of Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Denmark. 
At the same time, conversely, intra-industry trade in price and 
quality-differentiated products represented over 42% of total 
trade for the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Belgium, Lux-
embourg and the Netherlands, a share which grew between 1987 
and 1994 for all this group of countries plus Spain and Portugal. 
Analysis of price and quality-differentiated intra-industry trade 
shows a striking difference between northern and southerncoun-
tries. Scrutiny of the contribution to the trade balance of low, me-
dium and high price quality product ranges spotlights different 
country groupings. Germany has a comparative advantage in high 
price and quality product ranges, France in medium to high price 
and quality ranges, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands. Bel-
gium, Luxembourg and Denmark only in medium price and qual-
ity ranges, Spain in medium to low price and quality ranges, and 
Greece and Portugal only in low price and quality ranges. These 
specialisations have been unaffected by monetary fluctuations. 
In the period 1985-94, the share of medium price and quality 
products in overall intra-EU trade has declined (by some 10 
percentage points) to the benefit of high price quality products 
(plus 7 percentage points) and low price and quality products. 
This is especially so for the most advanced European economies, 
but even in the southern Member States, specialisation has 
changed and the share of low price and quality products has gen-
erally fallen whilst the share of high price and quality products has 
increased. 
Growing intra-industry trade with price differentiation implies 
that Member States are more and more specialised inside indus-
tries on products with differing price level ranges. For most ad-
vanced countries such an evolution involves growing intangible 
investment in R&D, training, innovations to compete in tradition-
al mature industries, and for less advanced countries, the possibil-
ity of entering high tech and high value added sectors and compet-
ing on price. 
2 There is inter-industry trade between two countries when one country's trade flow 
(imports or exports) with the other in a sector represents less than 109r of the other 
country's trade How (imports or exports) with it in the same sector. 
3 There is intra-industry trade in similar products when export and import unit values 
differ by less than 15% and there is intra-industry trade in differentiated products 
when unit values differ bv more than l5Vc. 
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7.2.2 Market integration through foreign direct investment 
Trade is not the only mechanism by which markets can become 
more integrated. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is an alternative 
to trade as a way of supplying foreign markets. Multinational 
companies are the main source of FDI flows, and the sales of mul­
tinational foreign affiliates are now by some estimates worth 
double the value of world exports. 
In fact, impact on FDI of the SMP seems to have been even more 
positive than its impact on trade. The European Union absorbed 
44.4% of FDI inflows from all countries in the world at the begin­
ning of the 1990s, compared to 28.2% in the period 1982-87. 
Moreover, intra-EU FDI (i.e., FDI flows between Member 
States) increased four times faster than intra-EU trade in the 
period 1984-92. Altogether, between 1984-85 and 1992-93, EU 
FDI inflows from all sources increased five times (seven times for 
intra-EU inflows). 
The impact on the domestic economy of FDI (FDI inflows rela­
tive to GDP) differs widely amongst Member States. At the be­
ginning of the 1990s, annual Irish FDI inflows were worth over 
9% of GDP. In Belgium and Luxembourg, the ratio was 4.7% a 
year. The Netherlands (2.7%) came next, then Portugal (2.6%), 
the UK (1.8%) and Spain (nearly 1.8%). By contrast, in Germany 
(less than 0.4%), Italy (0.4%) and Greece (0.6%) these figures 
were very low. Over the period 1986-93, two Member States 
(Belgium and Ireland) have gained considerable ground in terms 
of attractiveness as locations for FDI. In general, Ireland, Portu­
gal, Spain and the Benelux countries are among the ones which 
have benefited most from the Single Market in terms of FDI. 
7.2.3 Market integration and competition conditions inside the 
EU 
Cost reductions related to size achieved over the period 1985-93 
have been mostly the result of exploiting scale advantages linked 
to fixed investments in marketing, brand development, R&D 
spending and development of new production processes. Few ef­
ficiency improvements have been the consequence of exploiting 
purely technical efficiency gains related to the size of establish­
ments. 
Nevertheless, sectors such as distribution and road freight trans­
port do show remarkable productivity gains. Productivity and ef­
ficiency gains in the more regulated sectors (telecommunica­
tions, banking, airlines) have been less pronounced and, in 
general, it is very uncertain the extent to which observed changes 
can be linked to the SMP. Large gains have been observed only in 
liberalised telecommunication services. 
Evidence on price cost margins and business perceptions seems to 
indicate that the efficiency gains associated with large size have 
been passed on to consumers and users thanks to increased com­
petition associated with the SMP Over the period 1980-1992, 
European manufacturing industry registered a trend recovery of 
price-cost margins, at a yearly rate of about 2%, controlling for 
the evolution of the economic cycle and the diverging industrial 
structures of the EU Member States. Within this overall trend, 
however, statistical analysis confirms that implementation of the 
SMP imposed increasing pressure on price-cost margins, thus en­
suring that cost reductions have been passed on to consumers and 
downstream users. It is estimated that the SMP has led to a yearly 
1% reduction in margins since 1986/87. That is, in the absence of 
the SMP, margins would have grown faster over the period. 
Competitive conditions in services have also been significantly 
altered by the SMP A significant increase in competition is no­
ticeable in sectors such as telecommunication services or retail 
banking*, but also in airlines, where implementation of the SMF 
has only been partial so far. Overall, however, the increase ir 
competition seems to be less strong than in manufacturing sec­
tors, reflecting that many regulations are still maintained on ser­
vices and that the SMP has not been fully implemented in several 
domains. This increased competition has resulted in substantia] 
and quite general reductions in prices in sectors such as telecom­
munications, and a more selective decline of prices in segments ol 
the airline and banking industries. 
In road freight transport, the margins for cross-border traffic have 
declined sharply over the period 1986-94. The result has been ε 
reduction in real transportation prices which, together with effi­
ciency gains in the distribution sectors, have led to substantia: 
changes in the sourcing patterns of manufacturing and retailing 
firms. A wider range of sourcing possibilities has contributed tc 
declines in input costs. 
The changes in structures and the degree of competition of Euro­
pean markets prompted by the implementation of the SMP have 
also resulted in increased price convergence across the EU foi 
many goods. Between 1990 and 1993 the variation betweer 
Member States in prices (including taxes) has decreased frorr 
22.8% to 19.6% in consumer goods and from 31.8% to 28.6% ir 
services, but increased 28% to 31.7% in energy. 
7.3. Situation and development of balances of 
payments on current account 
Following deficits in both 1991 and 1992, the current account o1 
the Union as a whole has recorded either a zero balance, in 199: 
and 1994, or a small surplus, in 1995; a larger surplus is expectec 
in 1996. These balances, apart from being indicators of the 
amount of national savings, have in recent years become signal; 
of the state of domestic absorption relative to domestic output 
With complete liberalization of capital movements, and the re­
moval of residual exchange controls by some Member States ir 
the past two years, financial integration has continued to progress 
and the Union's financial markets are now closely integrated wit! 
international financial and capital markets. Consequently, the in­
ternational allocation process of excess domestic savings or ex­
cess domestic spending is facilitated. Several Member State« 
have systematically recorded current account surpluses since the 
beginning of the 1990s (Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands), while in others current ac­
count deficits of earlier years have become surpluses (Spain, Ita­
ly, Finland and Sweden); in five Member States (Germany 
Greece, Austria, Portugal and the United Kingdom) the currem 
account has remained in deficit since the beginning of the decade 
(see Table 7.1). 
In a majority of Member States the current account balance ha; 
been improving, despite the recovery of economic growth, since 
the end of the recession of the early 1990s. An important factor ir 
this has been the reduction of fiscal imbalances and the conse­
quent increase in national savings. Balance of payments position; 
relative to GDP in 1996 are not estimated to change markedl) 
compared to the previous year; latest estimates by the Commis­
sion services show reductions in the surplus in Belgium, Ireland 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Finland, and a widening of th( 
deficit in Greece and Portugal. The surplus is likely to rise in 199( 
in Denmark, France, Italy and Sweden, and the deficit is expectec 
to narrow in Germany and Austria. The current account surplus it 
Spain and the deficit in the United Kingdom are likely to be simi 
lar in scale in 1996 to the previous year. 
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3.8 
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­0.4 
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" ' A u t u m n 1996 economic forecasts. 
Source: Commission services. 
1994 
4.0 
1.6 
-1.4 
-1.0 
-1.2 
1.0 
3.4 
1.5 
15.9 
5.2 
-1 .0 
-1.8 
1.3 
-0.7 
-2.1 
0.0 
1995 
4.5 
0.6 
-1.2 
-2.7 
0.9 
1.6 
4.3 
2.4 
17.9 
5.2 
-2.3 
-0.2 
4.5 
0.6 
-1.8 
0.2 
1996 <·> 
4.1 
1.0 
­0.9 
­3 .0 
0.9 
1.7 
3.7 
3.6 
16.3 
4.9 
-1.9 
-1.0 
4.0 
1.2 
­1.8 
1.0 
7.4. Examination of development of unit labour 
costs and other price indices 
Developments in various consumer price indices (IICP, CPI, pri­
vate consumption deflator) contain important, albeit incomplete, 
information on the inflation environment prevailing in an econo­
my (see Chapter 3). To ensure a comprehensive and balanced ex­
amination of the degree of price stability and the sustainability of 
the inflation performance, the Treaty (Article 109j (1)) also re­
quires that "the development of unit labour costs and other price 
indices" should be considered. 
7.4.1 Unit labour costs 
Developments in unit labour costs take on a particular importance 
in the inflation process. They reflect trends in labour productivity 
and nominal compensation of employees per head. The latter not 
only play a key role in the determination of input costs and thus of 
consumer prices, but also reflect private agents' inflation ex­
pectations. They therefore serve as an important indicator, 
amongst others, of the credibility of the anti­inflationary policy 
stance pursued by the monetary authorities. 
At the Community level, growth in nominal compensation per 
employee has slowed down steadily from 4.2% in 1993 to 3.4% in 
1996, thereby reaching a level never attained over the past 
35 years. This deceleration was common to most Community 
countries, though to a varying extent (see Table 7.2). The salient 
exceptions are Italy, Sweden, and, to a lesser extent, Denmark. 
Over the same period, the increase in nominal compensation per 
employee accelerated from 3.7% to 6.2% in Italy, and from 4.4% 
to 6.6% in Sweden. This means that wage growth is now above 
the inflation rate, which could generate wage/price tensions when 
economic activity speeds up. 
Three major factors seem to explain the generally observed mod­
eration in nominal wages. Firstly, as already noted, wage settle­
ments appear to increasingly incorporate inflation expectations 
consistent with the price objectives announced by the monetary 
authorities. Secondly, wage negotiations seem to have increas­
ingly taken into account developments in the real side of the econ­
omy (output growth, labour mark et situation, profitability con­
cerns). Thirdly, actions to improve labour market flexibility have 
been undertaken in several Member States, including among 
others incentives for unemployed people to look for a job more 
actively, reforms of the educational and training system, mea­
sures to increase flexibility of working time and of rules govern­
ing employment conditions, and measures to improve the effi­
ciency of employment services. This set of structural measures 
should help to avoid excessive upward pressure on wages when 
activity speeds up, allowing unemployment to come down. 
The second element which influences unit labour costs is labour 
productivity. The latter has shown the usual cyclical pattern over 
the past few years. After slowing down during the recession of 
1993, gains in labour productivity picked up in 1994, along with 
the rebound in economic activity. However, the growth slow­
down experienced in the Community from mid­1995 again drove 
down apparent labour productivity growth, both in 1995 and in 
1996. 
As a result, growth in nominal unit labour costs was very modest 
over the 1994­1995 period. In 1994, eight countries showed an 
actual decline in unit labour costs, while in 1995, growth in unit 
labour costs was at or below 2%% in all Member States, with the 
exception of Greece. Thus, apart from Greece, growth in unit la­
bour costs was below the inflation rate in all the Community 
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countries over this two year period. This favourable evolution is 
mainly the result of moderate wage increases but is helped by the 
cyclical rebound in labour productivity growth. 
The moderate trend in unit labour costs has continued in 1996. 
While an acceleration is noticeable, the increase in unit labour 
costs remains consistent with continued favourable inflation 
trends in the Community and in most Member States. An accel­
eration in unit labour costs is expected in Spain, Italy and Sweden, 
and to a lesser extent in Denmark, Portugal, Finland, and the UK. 
For most of these countries, this acceleration remains moderate 
and leaves the increase in labour costs below or close to the infla­
tion rate, with the exception of Italy. In addition, this strengthen­
ing could be short-lived as it partly reflects cyclical factors. 
7.4.2 Import prices 
Given the increased degree of international openness of the Com­
munity economy, the evolution of import prices plays an impor­
tant role in domestic price formation. Import prices in domestic 
currency are the synthesis of the evolution of several different 
factors: the value of the exchange rate, international prices, the 
geographical composition of imports and the price-setting beha­
viour of foreign suppliers. 
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Several elements had helped in keeping the growth in import 
prices very moderate between 1990 and 1992: low oil prices, a 
weak US dollar, progress in trade liberalisation, coupled with the 
completion of the internal market. As a result, contributions of 
import prices to final demand inflation were negative in most 
Member States (and to varying degree) over this period. 
However, the effects of some of these factors were reversed or 
weakened during the 1993-95 period. Oil prices increased at a 
relatively fast pace in the first half of 1994 and again in early 
1995, while the dollar strengthened somewhat in 1993 and 1994. 
In addition, the curbing impact on prices exerted by the single 
market gradually faded. 
The upward impact of these factors on import prices varied 
strongly country by country, depending on developments on the 
exchange rate front. In countries whose currencies remained 
strong (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, the Netherlands 
and Austria), increases in import prices remained subdued (see 
Table 7.3), and their contributions to final demand inflation were 
still negative in 1993 and marginally positive in 1994-95 (see 
Table 7.4). On the other hand, in those countries which experi­
enced marked depreciation between 1993 and 1995 (Spain, Italy, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom), import prices increased 
strongly over the period. However, the knock-on effects on do­
mestic inflation were relatively limited, particularly owing to the 
appropriate economic policy response, but also to the weak 
growth environment prevailing in these countries. 
Most commodity prices have experienced another fall since 
mid-1996 (see Graph 7.1). On the other hand, the dollar has re­
covered somewhat since mid-1995. European currencies which 
depreciated significantly in early 1995 also strengthened during 
the course of 1995 and 1996. Consequently, the rise in import 
prices should remain moderate throughout the Community in 
1996. Their contributions to overall inflation are thus expected to 
narrow in Member States whose currencies have appreciated re­
cently, and to remain moderate in other Member States (around 
0.5%). 
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7.4.3 Effects of indirect tax changes on inflation 
Although during Stage Two the progress in budgetary consolida-
tion has been achieved predominantly through a reduction in the 
share of government expenditure relative to GDP, all Member 
States have also made use of increases in indirect taxes to this end 
but to varying degree. In several countries, increases in indirect 
taxes have contributed importantly to increases in inflation, as is 
suggested in Table 7.6 which shows estimates of the direct me-
chanical impact under the assumption of a full pass-through of 
changes in indirect taxes to consumer prices. 
The most important contributions of indirect tax increases to 
inflation have been observed in Belgium (1994), France (1995), 
Italy (1995), Finland (1995-1996) and the United Kingdom 
( 1994-95). However, more than the direct impact - which is, by 
definition, a one-off effect - what matters is the risk that in-
creases in indirect taxes raise inflation expectations and thus trig-
ger a wage/price spiral. This does not appear to have been the case 
in any of these countries. After showing a blip during the year in 
which increases in indirect tax occurred, inflation came down 
swiftly to its previous pattern within a short delay. 
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8. CONCLUDING SUMMARY 
8.1. General assessment 
This report has been prepared in accordance with the procedure 
and timetable set out in Article 109j of the Treaty. 
Substantial progress towards the achievement of a high degree of 
sustainable convergence has been made in all Member States 
since the beginning of the second stage of EMU. This progress 
gathered greater momentum during 1996, when efforts to achieve 
convergence (especially in the budgetary field) were intensified 
in many Member States. Other necessary preparations for the 
third stage are also advancing at the national level and at Commu­
nity level, where during the past year agreement has been reached 
on the scenario for the introduction of the single currency, the 
Commission has recently presented proposals for the legal status 
of the euro and for a stability pact to ensure budgetary discipline 
in the third stage, a consensus is emerging on the design of the so­
called "ERM II" and a communication campaign has been 
launched. 
The examination in Chapter 2 of this report of the compatibility 
between national legislation and Articles 107 and 108 of the 
Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB first of all set out the require­
ments that will have to be satisfied by the start of stage three. It 
then identified types of existing provisions, mainly in the statutes 
of national central banks, which do not yet conform. In virtually 
all Member States there continue to exist provisions that will need 
to be amended. Several Member States are preparing or have al­
ready brought forward proposals for changes in their legislation. 
In the next four chapters progress by each Member State in rela­
tion to each of the convergence criteria has been examined. 
The steady progress made in the European Union as a whole and 
by individual Member States in moving towards or maintaining a 
high degree of price stability has continued in 1996. The assess­
ment of price convergence has been made using the recently 
available interim indices of consumer prices (IICPs), which are 
more comparable than national indices but not yet fully harmo­
nised. The average rate of inflation for each Member State has 
been calculated as the percentage change in the average IICP in 
the latest 12 months relative to the average index in the preceding 
12 months. The reference value has been calculated for the pur­
pose of this report as the simple arithmetic average of the average 
inflation rates in the three best performing Member States plus 
1.5 percentage points. Calculated in this way and according to the 
latest available information (September 1996). the three best 
price performers were Finland, the Netherlands and Germany, 
and the reference value was 2.6% (see Table 8.1). Ten Member 
States (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Ireland, Luxem­
bourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland and Sweden) had aver­
age inflation rates below this reference value. A box in Chapter 3 
shows that the number of Member States respecting the price sta­
bility criterion is not at present sensitive to the method chosen to 
calculate the reference value. Five Member States still have aver­
age inflation rates above the reference value in September 
(Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal and the United Kingdom), but the 
differentials have tended to narrow in recent years and again in 
1996. Portugal and the United Kingdom are less than V­i percent­
age point above the reference value. 
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(%ofGDP)<2) 
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3.0 60 
3.3 130.6 
1.4 70.2 
4.0 60.8 
7.9 110.6 
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4.0 56.4 
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-0.9 7.8 
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4.0 71.1 
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rates 
ERM 
participation 
October 
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stability plus 2 percentage points. 
Only three Member States (Denmark, Ireland and Luxembourg) 
are currently not the subject of a Council Decision on the exis­
tence of an excessive government deficit and so respect the crite­
rion on the government budgetary position. The most recent deci­
sions under the excessive deficit procedure (Article 104c) were 
made in June 1996. Chapter 4 also reviewed budgetary develop­
ments in the Member States during the second stage and presented 
estimates of likely outturns in 1996. Significant progress has been 
made since 1993 by most Member States in reducing government 
deficits; in 1996 four countries (Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands) are expected to achieve a government bal­
ance better than the 3% of GDP deficit reference value; Belgium 
and Finland are likely to have deficits smaller than 3Vfe% of GDP. 
By the end of 1996 three Member States (France, Luxembourg 
and the United Kingdom) are expected to have a government 
gross debt ratio below the 60% of GDP reference value. In Ger­
many and Finland, the debt ratio is likely to exceed the reference 
value of 60% by the end of 1996, after having been consistently 
below that value. Several Member States have succeeded in re­
versing the earlier upward trend in the debt ratio, with a steady re­
duction since 1993 in Belgium, Denmark and Ireland and de­
clines expected in 1996 also in Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Portugal and Sweden. 
Since the turbulence in foreign exchange markets that led to the 
realignment in March 1995 within the ERM of the Spanish peseta, 
followed by the Portuguese escudo, exchange rate conditions 
have not been subject to severe tensions and the gap between the 
strongest and weakest currencies within the ERM band has ten­
ded to narrow (as described in Chapter 5). There are currently 
eleven currencies participating in the ERM. Nine of these (the 
currencies of Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, Ire­
land, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Portugal) have been 
members of the ERM for well over two years. Austria joined the 
ERM at the beginning of 1995 and Finland in the middle of Octo­
ber 1996. Four Member States (Greece, Italy, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom) are not currently participating in the ERM; the 
last three of these countries have seen a significant appreciation of 
their currencies during 1996, following the weakness of earlier 
years. 
The fourth criterion, on the durability of convergence as reflected 
in long-term interest rates, has been examined in Chapter 6. The 
assessment is based on the interest rates on comparable 10-year 
benchmark bonds (not fully comparable for Greece), using an av­
erage rate over the latest 12 months. The reference value has been 
calculated as the simple arithmetic average of the long-term in­
terest rates of the three best performing Member States in terms of 
price stability plus 2 percentage points. In September 1996 the 
reference value was 8.7%. Eleven Member States (Belgium, Den­
mark, Germany, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Austria, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom) have average 
interest rates below the reference value. Developments in bond 
markets during 1996, and especially in September, have resulted 
in a significant narrowing in interest rate differentials, especially 
among the higher-yielding countries where the criterion is not yet 
respected. 
The Treaty also requires that this report should examine develop­
ments in several other areas relevant to economic integration and 
convergence. These are dealt with in Chapter 7. Financial mar­
kets in ECU have tended to decline in importance since the severe 
currency turbulence of 1992 and 1993, but significant amounts of 
commercial transactions are settled in ECU. The spread between 
the private and public ECU is reducing as the certainty of the 1 for 
1 convertibility between the ECU and the euro is incorporated by 
the markets. The Single Market project has been having a signifi­
cant impact on economic integration, particularly on the structure 
of trade between Member States, on foreign direct investment 
flows, on competition conditions and on price convergence for 
certain categories of goods and services. The current account of 
the balance of payments reflects the national savings in each 
Member State; the European Union as a whole and ten Member 
30 
States are expected to be in surplus in 1996. Additional indicators 
for unit labour costs and import prices confirm the picture given in 
Chapter 3 of a satisfactory and soundly based price performance 
in most Member States. 
Mainly as a consequence of the persistence of budgetary imbal-
ances (although they are being reduced) and as illustrated by the 
existence of excessive government deficits in twelve Member 
States, it is clear that currently a majority of Member States has 
not yet made sufficient progress in the achievement of a high de-
gree of sustainable convergence. 
8.2. Summary by Member States 
In this final section of the report performance in relation to the 
convergence criteria is presented on a country-by-country basis 
in accordance with Article 109j(l) which requires an examina-
tion of the achievement of a high degree of sustainable conver-
gence by reference to the fulfilment by each Member State of the 
criteria. The criteria on inflation and long-term interest rates have 
been examined using data covering the period up to Septem-
ber 1996. The reference value has, in both cases, been calculated 
using the average of the three best performing Member States in 
terms of inflation. As regards the criterion on the government 
budgetary position, where relevant, Commission estimates of 
budgetary data for 1996 as a whole are presented. 
In Belgium the average inflation rate in the year ending in Sep-
tember 1996 stood at 1.6% which is below the reference value; 
during the same period nominal long-term interest rates were, on 
average, 6.7% which is also below the reference value. The Coun-
cil has not yet abrogated its Decision of 26 September 1994 ac-
cording to which an excessive government deficit exists in Bel-
gium. In 1996 the general government deficit is expected to be 
reduced by 0.8 percentage points to 3.3% of GDP; the govern-
ment gross debt ratio is likely to decline from 133.7% of GDP in 
1995 to 130.6% in 1996. Belgium has been a member of the ERM 
since its inception; in the latest two years the BFR has respected 
the fluctuation margins of the ERM and has not been subject to 
severe tensions and the BFR bilateral central rate has not been de-
valued. 
In Denmark the average inflation rate in the year ending in Sep-
tember 1996 stood at 2.2% which is below the reference value; 
during the same period nominal long-term interest rates were, on 
average, 7.4% which is also below the reference value. The Coun-
cil decided on 27 June 1996 to abrogate its Decision of 26 Sep-
tember 1994 on the existence of an excessive government deficit 
in Denmark. In 1996 the general government deficit is expected to 
be reduced by 0.2 percentage points to 1.4% of GDP; the govern-
ment gross debt ratio is likely to decline further to 70.2% in 1996 
from 71.9% of GDP in 1995. Denmark has been a member of the 
ERM since its inception; in the latest two years the DKR has re-
spected the fluctuation margins of the ERM and has not been sub-
ject to severe tensions and the DKR bilateral central rate has not 
been devalued. 
In Germany the average inflation rate in the year ending in Sep-
tember 1996 stood at 1.3% which is the third best performance in 
the EU and is therefore below the reference value; during the 
same period nominal long-term interest rates were, on average, 
6.3% which is also below the reference value. The Council de-
cided on 27 June 1996 that an excessive government deficit exists 
in Germany. In 1996 the general government deficit is expected to 
increase to 4.0% of GDP from 3.5% in 1995; the government 
gross debt ratio which has been below 60% of GDP is likely to in-
crease in 1996 reaching 60.8% of GDP. Germany has been a 
member of the ERM since its inception; in the latest two years the 
DM has respected the fluctuation margins of the ERM and has not 
been subject to severe tensions and the DM bilateral central rate 
has not been devalued. 
In Greece the average inflation rate in the year ending in Septem-
ber 1996 stood at 8.4% which is significantly above the reference 
value; during the same period nominal long-term interest rates 
were, on average, 15.1%, also clearly above the reference value. 
The Council has not yet abrogated its Decision of 26 Septem-
ber 1994 according to which an excessive government deficit ex-
ists in Greece. In 1996 the general government deficit is expected 
to be reduced by 1.2 percentage points to 7.9% of GDP; the gov-
ernment gross debt ratio is likely to decline from 111.8% of GDP 
in 1995 to 110.6% in 1996. The DR does not participate in the 
ERM. 
In Spain the average inflation rate in the year ending in Septem-
ber 1996 stood at 3.8% which is above the reference value; during 
the same period nominal long-term interest rates were, on aver-
age, 9.5% which is also above the reference value. The Council 
has not yet abrogated its Decision of 26 September 1994 accord-
ing to which an excessive government deficit exists in Spain. In 
1996 the general government deficit is expected to be reduced by 
2.2 percentage points to 4.4% of GDP; the government gross debt 
ratio is likely to increase from 65.7% of GDP in 1995 to 67.8% in 
1996. Spain has been a member of the ERM since June 1989; in 
March 1995 the bilateral central rate of the peseta was devalued 
by 7%, at the initiative of Spain; since then the PTA has respected 
the fluctuation margins of the ERM and has not been subject to 
severe tensions. 
In France the average inflation rate in the year ending in Septem-
ber 1996 stood at 2.1 % which is below the reference value; during 
the same period nominal long-term interest rates were, on aver-
age, 6.6% which is also below the reference value. The Council 
has not yet abrogated its Decision of 26 September 1994 accord-
ing to which an excessive government deficit exists in France. In 
1996 the general government deficit is expected to be reduced by 
0.8 percentage points to 4.0% of GDP; the government gross debt 
ratio continues to be below 60% of GDP in 1996. France has been 
a member of the ERM since its inception; in the latest two years 
the FF has respected the fluctuation margins of the ERM and has 
not been subject to severe tensions and the FF bilateral central rate 
has not been devalued. 
In Ireland the average inflation rate in the year ending in Septem-
ber 1996 stood at 2.1% which is below the reference value; during 
the same period nominal long-term interest rates were, on aver-
age, 7.5% which is also below the reference value. Ireland is not 
the subject of a Council decision on the existence of an excessive 
government deficit. The general government deficit has been be-
low 3% of GDP since 1989 and is expected to be reduced further 
by 0.4 percentage points to 1.6% of GDP in 1996; the government 
gross debt ratio is likely to decline further to 74.7% in 1996 from 
81.6% of GDP in 1995. Ireland has been a member of the ERM 
since its inception; in the latest two years the IRL has respected 
the fluctuation margins of the ERM and has not been subject to 
severe tensions and the IRL bilateral central rate has not been de-
valued. 
In Italy the average inflation rate in the year ending in Septem-
ber 1996 stood at 4.7% which is clearly above the reference val-
ue; during the same period nominal long-term interest rates were, 
on average, 10.3% which is also above the reference value. The 
Council has not yet abrogated its Decision of 26 September 1994 
according to which an excessive government deficit exists in Ita-
ly. In 1996 the general government deficit is expected to be re-
duced by 0.5 percentage points to 6.6% of GDP; the government 
gross debt ratio is likely to decline from 124.9% of GDP in 1995 
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to 123.4 % in 1996. Italy was a member of the ERM from its in-
ception until September 1992 when the intervention obligations 
for the LIT were suspended; since then the LIT has not re-entered 
the ERM. 
In Luxembourg the average inflation rate in the year ending in 
September 1996 stood at 1.3% which is below the reference val-
ue; during the same period nominal long-term interest rates were, 
on average, 7.0% which is also below the reference value. Lux-
embourg is not the subject of a Council decision on the existence 
of an excessive government deficit. The general government fi-
nancial position has traditionally been in a surplus, expected to 
amount to 0.9% of GDP in 1996. The government gross debt ratio 
continues to remain significantly below 60% of GDP. Luxem-
bourg has been a member of the ERM since its inception; in the 
latest two years the LFR has respected the fluctuation margins of 
the ERM and has not been subject to severe tensions and the LFR 
bilateral central rate has not been devalued. 
In the Netherlands the average inflation rate in the year ending in 
September 1996 stood at 1.2% which is the second best perfor-
mance in the EU and is therefore below the reference value; dur-
ing the same period nominal long-term interest rates were, on av-
erage, 6.3% which is also below the reference value. The Council 
has not yet abrogated its Decision of 26 September 1994 accord-
ing to which an excessive government deficit exists in the Nether-
lands. In 1996 the general government deficit is expected to be re-
duced by 1.4 percentage points to 2.6% of GDP; the government 
gross debt ratio is likely to decline from 79.7% of GDP in 1995 to 
78.7 % in 1996. The Netherlands have been a member of the ERM 
since its inception; in the latest two years the HFL has respected 
the fluctuation margins of the ERM and has not been subject to 
severe tensions and the HFL bilateral central rate has not been de-
valued. 
In Austria the average inflation rate in the year ending in Septem-
ber 1996 stood at 1.7% which is below the reference value; during 
the same period nominal long-term interest rates were, on aver-
age, 6.5% which is also below the reference value. The Council 
has not yet abrogated its Decision of 10 July 1995 according to 
which an excessive government deficit exists in Austria. In 1996 
the general government deficit is expcted to be reduced by 
1.6 percentage points to 4.3% of GDP; the government gross debt 
ratio is likely to increase from 69.0% of GDP in 1995 to 71.7 % in 
1996. Austria has been a member of the ERM since early Janu-
ary 1995; since then the ÖS has respected the fluctuation margins 
of the ERM and has not been subject to severe tensions and the ÖS 
bilateral central rate has not been devalued. 
In Portugal the average inflation rate in the year ending in Sep-
tember 1996 stood at 3.0% which is above the reference value; 
during the same period nominal long-term interest rates were, on 
average* 9.4% which is also above the reference value. The Coun-
cil has not yet abrogated its Decision of 26 September 1994 ac-
cording to which an excessive government deficit exists in Portu-
gal. In 1996 the general government deficit is expected to be 
reduced by 1.1 percentage points to 4.0% of GDP; the govern-
ment gross debt ratio is likely to decline from 71.7.% of GDP in 
1995 to 71.1 % in 1996. Portugal has been a member of the ERM 
since April 1992. In March 1995, following the devaluation of the 
Spanish peseta, the bilateral central rate of the Portuguese escudo 
was devalued by 3.5%. Since then the ESC has respected the fluc-
tuation margins of the ERM and has not been subject to severe 
tensions. 
In Finland the average inflation rate in the year ending in Sep-
tember 1996 stood at 0.9% which is the best performance in the 
EU and is therefore below the reference value; during the same 
period nominal long-term interest rates were, on average, 7.4% 
which is also below the reference value. The Council has not yet 
abrogated its Decision of 10 July 1995 according to which an ex-
cessive government deficit exists in Finland. In 1996 the general 
government deficit is expected to be reduced by 1.9 percentage 
points to 3.3% of GDP; the government gross debt ratio which has 
been below 60% of GDP is likely to increase in 1996, reaching 
61.3% of GDP. Finland has been a member of the ERM since 
mid-October 1996. 
In Sweden the average inflation rate in the year ending in Septem-
ber 1996 stood at 1.6% which is below the reference value; during 
the same period nominal long-term interest rates were, on aver-
age, 8.5% which is below the reference value. The Council has 
not yet abrogated its Decision of 10 July 1995 according to which 
an excessive government deficit exists in Sweden. In 1996 the 
general government deficit is expected to be reduced by 4.2 per-
centage points to 3.9% of GDP; the government gross debt ratio is 
likely to decline from 78.7% of GDP in 1995 to 78.1% in 1996. 
The SKR does not participate in the ERM. 
In the United Kingdom the average inflation rate in the year end-
ing in September 1996 stood at 3.0% which is above the reference 
value; during the same period nominal long-term interest rates 
were, on average, 8.0% which is below the reference value. The 
Council has not yet abrogated its Decision of 26 September 1994 
according to which an excessive government deficit exists in the 
United Kingdom. In 1996 the general government deficit is ex-
pected to be reduced by 1.2 percentage points to 4.6% of GDP; 
the government gross debt ratio continues to be below 60% of 
GDP in 1996. The currency of the United Kingdom entered the 
ERM in October 1990; the participation of the UKL in the ERM 
was suspended in September 1992 and has not been resumed. 
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Supplement A - Issues discussed 
Report on convergence in the European Union in 1995 
The improvement in the external position of CEEC 
Madrid employment report (contribution of the ECO/FIN­Councü) 
Financial situation of industrial enterprises 
Economic forecasts for 1995­1997 
Mergers and acquisitions 
Reports on the borrowing and lending activities of the Community in 1995 
Report on the implementation of macro­financial assistance to third countries in 1995 
Economic forecast for 1996­1998 
Principal economic policy measures - November 1996 
Community (EUR-15) 
6.11 Commission adopts a report on progress by Member States with economic conver­
gence in view of their participation in the euro ("1996 Convergence Report"). 
The EMI adopts its convergence report. 
Commission approves the Economic Forecasts of Autumn 1996. 
Commission approves a report on progress towards achievement of economic and social 
cohesion within the ER ("First Cohesion Report"). 
25.11 Italian lira re­joins the ERM of the EMS. 
Belgium (B) 
None. 
Denmark (DK) 
27.11 The minority government reaches agreement with the Socialist People's Party on 
the 1997 budget. The agreement should ensure parliamentary support for a balanced 
general government budget in 1997. Compared with the government's draft budget pro­
posal, provision is made for increased expenditure on education, working conditions, 
environmental protection, research and socially disadvantaged children. Higher envi­
ronmental taxes, lower transfers to enterprises and one­off measures, including privatiz­
ations, will boost revenue as compared with the draft proposal. 
Germany (D) 
15.11 The Bundestag approves the reform of the public health system (Krankenkassen­
Neuordnungsgesetz). The main change is that, from now on, patients' contribution to the 
costs of medicines and hospital stays will have to be raised whenever any individual 
health insurance fund increases contribution rates. Given that patients have a right to 
switch from one fund to another, this measure is designed to foster competition by en­
hancing patients' awareness of costs. The law also improves cost­limitation clauses for 
the chronically iti. 
Greece (EL) 
29.11 The 1997 budget is presented to Parliament: the target for the central government 
deficit is set at 6.2% of GDP as against 9.3% in 1996. 
Spain (E) 
None. 
France(F) 
13.11 The Cabinet approves the draft supplementary finance law for 1996, which holds 
the general government budget deficit at the level stipulated in the initial Finance Law 
(FF 287.9 billion, or 3.65% of GDP). 
28.11 Parliament adopts the draft law on the financing of social security, which aims to 
reduce the general scheme's deficit from FF 51.5 billion this year to FF 30 billion next 
year. 
20.11 Parliament adopts the draft finance law for 1997, which is designed to reduce the 
general government budget deficit to FF 284.8 billion (3.5% of GDP) in 1997. 
Ireland (IRL) 
None. 
Italy (I) 
16.11 The Italian Chamber of Deputies approves by an overwhelming majority the gov­
ernment's draft 1997 budget law. On 21 November the draft is sent to the Senate for dis­
cussion. By Italian law, both branches of Parliament have until December 31 to give their 
final approval to the budget. 
25.11 The lira re­enters the ERM at a central parity of LIT 990 to the German mark. 
Luxembourg (L) 
None. 
Netherlands (NL) 
None. 
Austria (A) 
None. 
Portugal (P) 
11.11 Social security pensions are to rise by 3.9% on average as from 1 December 1996: 
those on the lowest pensions will receive the largest increase. 
15.11 The draft budget for 1997 is approved by Parliament. It sets a target of 2.9% of 
GDP for the general government deficit. 
19.11 The Bank of Portugal cuts its money market intervention rates. The repo rate is 
lowered by 10 basis points to 6.9%. The overnight standing facility and the rates for mop­
ping up liquidity are reduced by 50 and 40 basis points to 8.5% and 6.4% respectively. 
Finland (FIN) 
22.11 The government lays before Parliament a proposal for a third supplementary 
budget for 1996. The proposal includes no new expenditure items but takes account of 
the extra privatization receipts which have accrued to the State over the last few months 
and which will curb the increase in central government debt by FMK 1.5 billion (0.3% 
of GDP). 
Sweden (S) 
26.11 Central bank cuts repo rate by 25 basis points to 4.35%. 
United Kingdom (UK) 
30.10 Following his monthly meeting with the Chancellor, the Governor of the Bank of 
England raises the base rate to 6% from 5%%. 
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